Which war? It’s a question you may fairly ask. During World War I in April 1916 an Anglo-Indian army surrendered to the Ottomans at al-Kut in what was then called Mesopotamia. It marked the end of a disastrous campaign to take Baghdad. 13,000 Empire prisoners were marched to Aleppo and many died en route. Historian Christopher Catherwood called it “the worst defeat of the Allies in World War I”, Jan Morris “the most abject capitulation in Britain’s military history”. But 10 months later a fresh Indian army recovered al-Kut and took Baghdad.
Modern day Iraq was under strong British influence from
the end of World War I after 1916’s infamous Sykes-Picot accord. It continued in
the 20s and 30s under a League of Nations mandate and even after nominal
independence in 1932. But in 1941 four Iraqi officers seized power and made
overtures to Nazi Germany. The threat was clear - to shut off the oil supply -
the reason Britain wanted effective control. A scratch Allied force with ghost
tanks and a few aircraft recovered Basra, then Baghdad and the oilfields,
driving out the coup leaders.
Kuwait invasion
The next occasion of British military intervention was
in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Britain joined a US led 35 nation coalition
in the Gulf War ‘Operation Desert Storm’ to clear Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s
forces from Kuwait. It was achieved quickly and sanctions were applied to curtail
Iraq’s military capacity, notably its production and use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). These were chemical and biological warheads and had been used
against the Kurds. In genocidal attacks on regime opponents - the ‘Anfal’ -
perhaps 200,000 were killed.
These WMD warheads had also been used against neighbours in the Gulf War, and against Iran in an earlier conflict. And Iraq had adapted Scud rockets with a longer range. So a detailed programme of weapons inspection was started, along with US and British enforced no-fly zones, to protect vulnerable groups in both northern Kurdish areas and in southern Iraq. 2003’s conflict was really a continuation of the 1990 Gulf War with weapons inspectors, sanctions and no-fly zones maintained against a rogue regime universally regarded as dangerously brutal.
Fighting in Iraq
So Britain was no stranger to fighting in Iraq. It had
been doing so off and on for 90 years. And given the history, particularly
under Saddam Hussein, when UN weapons inspectors were first admitted, then
expelled, then re-admitted to Iraq but then harassed in 2002, there was
widespread concern about what might happen. Major abuse under the Oil-for-Food
programme caused over 100,000 children to die when Iraq’s government diverted
money earmarked for food and medicines. Saddam had a dreadful record and was cruelly
untrustworthy.
There’s little point in going over the 2003 Iraq
invasion by a US led coalition, supported by Britain, that overthrew Saddam
Hussein. Huge amounts of written material have been generated including
evidence from several enquiries. In summary the attack was launched in March
and within a few weeks Baghdad, and most of the rest of the country, had fallen
to the Coalition. The capital saw a widespread outpouring of public gratitude
to the invaders. But as a precursor of what was to come, a wave of civil
disorder, crime and extensive looting followed.
WMD enquiries
The Iraq Survey Group of specialist weapons inspectors came in soon afterwards to conduct a detailed, thorough search of the country, but found no evidence of either a store of WMDs or an active capability of making them. They did find chemical weapons in a degraded or damaged state left over from the 1990-91 Gulf War, and some basic laboratory facilities not recently used. They found “clear evidence of his (Saddam’s) intent to resume WMDs as soon as sanctions were lifted”. They also found evidence that chemical weapons had earlier been transported to Syria.
Given the UK investigations held on the British role, including Hutton and Butler, you would be right in thinking the reasons for Britain’s involvement were questioned. The country was in coalition with several nations, namely the US, Australia, Spain, Poland and others. UK critics seemed programmed to call everything a ‘whitewash’ demanding enquiry after enquiry, until one came up with the answer they were looking for. This was part of a growing appetite for conspiracy theories, which, largely through social media, has characterised the 21st century and is much in evidence today.
Support and opposition
What were the reasons for Britain joining the US and a wider coalition to remove Saddam Hussein? Iraq’s presumed possession of WMDs, and the maintenance of the facilities to produce them, was the main one. Saddam’s appalling human rights’ record, attacks on neighbours and his unhelpful attitude to the UN inspectors reinforced the case. As the US was going to invade anyway, Britain might have deemed it right to help its foremost ally and guarantor of its security. There could also be an opportunity for Britain to use its knowledge and experience of Iraq to try and influence US decisions for the better. This does not seem an unreasonable rationale.
A widespread and persistent myth, particularly among Britain’s left, is that Tony Blair's government lied about the reasons for invading Iraq. It was a stitch up with the Americans - it was really all about oil, and exerting US power in the Middle East. But the Conservatives supported the action, as did Parliament. Still, accusations of bad faith were and continue to be levied. But why would the Blair government base its case on something it knew to be untrue when it would soon be demolished by events? It makes no sense at all.
Imagine the furore and consequences if governments had
suspected WMD in Iraq, and Saddam then used these against his neighbours, or the
UK and its allies. Many other countries’ intelligence services also believed
Saddam had WMDs but their governments were unable or unwilling to do much about
it. It was surely morally just for Britain to join the US and others to get rid
of an evil and brutally murderous dictator. His record on using chemical WMDs
on Iraqis and on other countries was atrocious. If you genuinely believed Iraq
had WMDs, as the intelligence suggested, could you have just done nothing?
Bush and Blair 2006
So lies? Hardly, though Blair himself said he should
have questioned the intelligence more thoroughly. Was it illegal? Under
unanimous UN Resolution 1441 Iraq was given a final opportunity to comply with
its obligations and disarm or “face serious consequences” of failing to disarm.
International lawyers still differ on whether this interpretation meant
force would be the result of non-compliance.
Aftermath of mistakes
Everyone agrees the aftermath was disastrous. The US
Defense Dept took charge of Iraq’s post-invasion government, first under
retired Gen. Jay Garner for three weeks, then with Paul Bremer for a year. Two
calamitous decisions were made. Iraq’s armed forces, expected to be reorganised
under the new authority, were disbanded. Hundreds of thousands of trained men
with no jobs or earnings were suddenly unleashed. The other mistake was to
dismiss every member of Saddam’s Ba’ath party, down to minor officials and
40,000 teachers who’d joined the organisation to keep their jobs. With no
effective administrative structure it was chaos.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was soon under attack as an insurgency grew, with weapons supplied by former Iraqi Army and Republican Guard soldiers. Religious radicals joined in with sectarian attacks on opponents. Much of Iraq was soon ablaze as US and UK troops remained amid UN efforts to stabilise the country and create a viable state able to defend itself at home and from outside forces.
Ethnic/Religious Groups in Iraq
Hindsight is 20:20. The Chilcot Enquiry into Britain’s involvement in this episode was set up in 2009, but reported more than seven years later in 2016, 13 years after the event. It produced 12 volumes of material, but was criticised for the time it took, that it had no soldier or lawyer as a member, and that it interviewed only four Americans and not a single Iraqi. It was expected that the report would be critical of the government. It was, but maybe not to the extent demanded by the harshest critics, even though it released unprecedented transcripts of telephone calls between Blair and US President George W Bush.
Chilcot strongly criticised the intelligence
services, and said the legal basis for war was far from satisfactory. The UK
overestimated its ability to influence US decisions, and planning and
preparation, particularly for the post invasion period, was wholly inadequate.
But it did not question Blair’s belief in the case for war. Acknowledging that Chilcot
criticised the preparation, planning and the US relationship, Blair said it
“should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies and deceit…whether people
agree or disagree with my decision to take military action against Saddam
Hussein, I took it in good faith and in what I believed to be the best
interests of the country”.
Post Iraq
At the time of the action, a majority of the public in
Britain, the US and Iraq supported the invasion. The Blair government was
returned with a sizable majority in 2005 as well. Also in that year, the UN
unanimously passed the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) resolution - a global
commitment to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. It’s a framework to employ measures to prevent such crimes and
protect civilians from them. The authority to employ force rests with the UN
Security Council, which is subject to veto by authoritarian China and Russia. So it’s considered a measure of last resort.
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