Each year on October 21st, the Royal Navy hosts its commemorative dinner marking the anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar. A highlight of the navy’s social calendar, it celebrates Lord Nelson’s 1805 victory over the combined fleets of France and Spain, a crushing win for Britain, against more numerous and heavily armed opponents. So what were Trafalgar’s results? Did it prevent Napoleon from invading Britain, and did it shorten the war? Did bold new tactics destroy the French fleet? And did all the officers and men ‘do their duty’?
Trafalgar and the Napoleonic War
Let’s take the points in order. One of the most persistent
myths is that Trafalgar saved Britain from invasion. From early in 1805 Napoleon
had spent months creating his ‘Army of England’, plus a vast fleet of
transports to get the force across the Channel. But the Admiralty were watching
closely and planning accordingly. Trying to pull France’s battleships together and get
them into the Channel to cover an army crossing, Napoleon was blocked at every
turn. On 22nd July an engagement off Finistère saw Adm. Calder
finally kill off this hope. Within a month Napoleon realised his plans wouldn’t
work. He abandoned the project. This was two months before the battle of Trafalgar.
Battle of Cape Finistere, William Anderson
So did Trafalgar shorten the war? Hardly, as the conflict continued for a further 10 years. Once Napoleon had left behind his British
invasion plans, he moved against Austria. Hearing the Austrians were mobilising
he quickly turned to his preferred style of land warfare, comprehensively defeating
them with his biggest victory at Austerlitz. This took place six weeks after
Trafalgar. Napoleon’s power then actually grew with big wins against Prussia,
Russia and the invasion of Spain.
What about the supposed new battle tactics, the product of Nelson’s genius? Essentially the plan involved splitting the British fleet into two columns and attacking side on. The aim was to cut the enemy’s line and surround the middle section, with the van removed from the fight for some time. In fact these tactics had been used several times before, by other commanders as well as Nelson. No parts of the plan were particularly revolutionary. What Nelson did was to work it out in detail well in advance and share it in meetings with his officers.
Battle arithmetic
Cape Trafalgar is on the coast of southern Spain. The
Franco-Spanish fleet was of 33 battleships and 2,600 guns against the British
27 battleships and 2,100 guns. Total firepower was huge, amounting to 13 times
that employed at Waterloo. In personnel terms the Franco-Spanish fleet was
about 30,000 strong, nearly twice that of Britain’s 17,000. The size of the
fleets, their weight of metal and the numbers of men involved certainly mark
this as a great naval clash.
One column was headed by Nelson, the other by his
deputy Adm. Collingwood. The French commander Adm. Villeneuve, guessed Nelson
would adopt this battle plan, but he could do little about it. His fleet had
turned from south to north, and was sailing in a fairly ragged crescent.
Organising the French and Spanish elements presented problems. There was little
wind, however, so the British columns, and particularly one of the lead ships, Victory, took severe punishment when approaching
the enemy at barely walking pace.
Battle of Trafalgar, by Turner
There followed the usual grim scene in battles of this era. With broken masts, sails and bodies, plus gun-smoke, little could be seen of any signals. Visibility beyond a few feet was all but impossible. Nelson had left individual captains to decide on actions according to the situation they faced. A sound policy, and the tactics worked largely as set out. After a few hours of close combat many of Villeneuve’s ships had been damaged and captured and the battle was effectively over. The Royal Navy had lost no ships but nearly 500 men - the Franco-Spanish fleet 22 ships and nearly 5,000 men.
The Nelson effect
One of the dead was of course, Nelson, hit by a musket ball. He was only 47, but already had a worldwide reputation. Some of this it has to be said was burnished by him, a shrewd and assiduous self-promoter. But he was still a great commander, and his brilliant performance in 1798’s Battle of the Nile could hardly be bettered. With his bold, and often rather daredevil approach, he had great qualities as a leader and was loved by his men. But it’s not true that his sailors at Trafalgar were battle hardened. Most had never experienced battle before. One in four had had less than a year at sea, and 10% were not British.
Admiral Lord Nelson
A storm soon after the battle forced Britain to scuttle most of the ships it had captured. Two days later, a daring sortie from Cadiz by some of the survivors re-took two of the ‘prizes’ from their British captors, and another, snatched from the prize crew, was wrecked later. So the net result for the Royal Navy was rather below the headline figures. And Nelson’s famous signal “England expects”... seemed not to galvanise everyone. Capt. Berry blazed away ineffectively and Collingwood’s flag captain reported frankly that some officers had performed “notoriously ill”.
Was the French Navy severely hit? No. France had another fleet at Brest and a squadron at Rochefort that were never committed to the engagement. And Napoleon was soon able to replace the lost ships by building new ones. By 1815 France had 80 capital ships, a net rise of 20 vessels. The real disaster was felt by the Spanish Navy which lost some of its biggest and most powerful ships, and perhaps more importantly, many of its best officers, including Trafalgar commander Adm. Gravina. This was a blow from which Spain never recovered.
Adm. Federico Gravina
Economic war
So a pretty long list of myths, or at least
misapprehensions, about the event. What were the true results? Economic warfare
followed in 1806 as France changed tack to the Continental System, restricting British
trade with Europe. Britain applied a blockade on France and much of Europe and
its global trade at first suffered from declining trade relations with the US. The
Continental System ruined some French industries and caused a recession in
French ports and among French allies. It backfired badly on Napoleon and led to
numerous conflicts within his nascent Empire.
The blockade was perhaps unsurprisingly honoured extensively in the breach. Britain managed to ease some practical restrictions in order to import plenty of French wine and brandy. In return Napoleon allowed British made boots to be imported into France - he believed they were of better quality and wanted his army to have the best. But let's not generalise from the particular. In truth the blockade mainly held.
Now with control of the oceans Britain looked to expand trade outside Europe. It also grew its political influence in Latin America - having in 1807 evacuated Portugal’s royal family to Brazil. Trade with Latin America doubled in three years. Britain committed to Portugal, and after Napoleon’s invasion of the country, to Spain, sending and supplying an army under Wellington. Economic success allowed generous funding of European alliances that left Britain in the fight and eventually bore fruit. British money kept the Prussians in the field and helped bankroll the European alliances of 1814-15 which finally defeated Napoleon.
Says strategic historian Martin Robson, “Britain’s
position in 1815 as the world’s only superpower was based upon setting the
rules of global trade…insured in London and carried in British ships - but her
aims were only achieved by engagement with European politics”. Trafalgar not
only kept Britain solvent during a time of economic isolation from Europe, it
allowed the country to compensate for lost European trade until the time was right
to re-engage politically and economically with Europe.
Nelson's reputation
Perhaps most important of all, Trafalgar’s psychological
effect was notable. The Royal Navy was shown to be stronger in training,
professionalism and tactics than any rivals, though it had to fight limited
actions to prevent ships of smaller European navies like Denmark's falling into
French hands. Command of the seas generated the national confidence to build a
global empire relying almost entirely on sea communications. Nelson’s
unorthodox tactics were rarely repeated by later naval commanders. But the
self-image of the Royal Navy - and the country - is bound up with his reputation.
Place names all over the world tell a story, if only a partial one. A French friend's father, a former ambassador, with delightful humour put it well. Travelling in a taxi through London several years ago, his young colleague exclaimed with astonishment, "But these are all battles we lost!"
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