1810-1830 Railways - Age of the 'Rocket'

The impact of the railways on the economic, social and cultural life of 19^th century Britain was phenomenal. Perhaps only the internet has produced a comparable change in our own time. As an ‘initiating culture’ it was huge. Author James Atlee points out, “Like the web, railways forged previously unimagined connections and opened up new opportunities for commerce, while at the same time destroying long-established industries and the communities built around them”.

Railways were central to the spread of the industrial revolution and helped make Britain one of the world’s richest and strongest nations. But were the railways really new? What problems had to be solved before steam locomotion was properly established as the best and most sustainable answer for a national transportation system? What myths had to be dismissed along the way? And finally were the widespread effects predicted?

Early railways

Against common belief hundreds of miles of railways were in use in Britain before the 1830 Liverpool to Manchester line opened. This initiative is generally thought of as Britain’s first practicable railway project, linking two major cities. But tracks with wooden rails to support wheeled vehicles had actually been in use since the 16^th century. From the 1770s cast iron was more widely used for rails, though the material cracked and it was only when wrought iron came in from 1820 that the problem was solved.

Little Eaton Gangway - last horse drawn railway, 1908

It’s often assumed that these early railways, based on horse drawn power, were only used to link mines and quarries to navigable rivers and canals. But it’s not so. They served to connect market towns, or as local systems for factories, farms, building sites or military bases. The reduced rolling resistance of a railed surface was the advantage here, when moving heavy loads on roads was both risky and difficult.

Steam engines had of course been in use for many years. But adapting the heavy and cumbersome static models used in mills or to pump out mines was a problem. Too big and too inefficient. They had been used for traction to haul wagons. Pioneer Cornish engineer Richard Trevithick actually produced a smaller version of one of his engines for a locomotive in 1802. It was not a success.

First passengers

The first rail locomotive to carry passengers was perhaps Trevithick’s in 1804, at Merthyr Tydfil, before one in Gateshead the following year. In 1808 his boldly named Catch Me Who Can had a London debut. In 1813 Puffing Billy, designed by Hedley and Hackworth, was first used on the Stockton and Darlington tramway. Next year George Stephenson improved on the model with his first locomotive, Blücher. Stephenson and his son Robert learnt from each new design, building several locomotives to haul coal at Killingworth, North Tyneside.

Locomotion No. 1

In 1821 the Stephensons were tasked with building the new Stockton to Darlington Railway, having persuaded its backers that locomotives were the best route forward. Large crowds saw George Stephenson drive Locomotion No. 1 off in September 1825, pulling 36 wagons for the nine mile trip. But there was only one purpose built passenger coach. This first train averaged a speed of 8mph. As the line got busier, train drivers had to pay their firemen, and buy the coke, out of their own wages. In 1828 the boiler on Locomotion No 5 exploded, killing a fireman. A few months later, the same happened with No. 1, killing the driver.

Rainhill trials

So clearly while locomotive power wasn't new there were limitations to its application at the time. To try and plot a realistic way forward a competition was held at Rainhill, Lancashire in 1829. It would establish the best means of traction for the proposed Liverpool to Manchester railway, and if it were locomotive (not at that stage completely certain), to identify the best design. The contest rules assumed some passenger usage, so reliability was a given. Weight restrictions dictated a light locomotive. The train had to travel 70 miles at an average speed of over 10mph. It therefore had to be state of the art.

George Stephenson

The Stephensons’ design used a single pair of driving wheels, with pistons directly connected to them, cylinders closer to the horizontal and a separate firebox. But probably their key modification, especially after the recent accidents, was a multi-tubular boiler. This created a much bigger contact area of hot pipe with boiler water, and thus far greater efficiency. The Stephensons’ company treasurer, Henry Booth, may have suggested the change. It worked well and became the standard boiler design from then on. The Stephensons’ Rainhill model was called the Rocket. Reaching 30mph, it blew away the competition and showed locomotives could travel distances reliably and at speed.  

We might at this point remember that railways had not originally been conceived to carry people. They were built for freight of various types, particularly coal. The Liverpool to Manchester was the first railway not built to carry coal, but cotton. Yet after the success of Stockton-Darlington in attracting human ‘goods’ without trying to, (people typically travelled standing on trains in simple open wagons), the Liverpool-Manchester railway did incorporate plans for passenger traffic. Indeed it was a specific stipulation of the Rainhill trials. It’s just that the number of people wanting to travel exceeded all expectations.

Stephenson's 'Rocket'

The cost advantage of freight carriage over roads or canals had been carefully computed. But no-one thought much about the market for human travel. Long distance journeys at the time were rare, and roads often bad, especially in winter. A boat trip might be preferable. There were cries of “If God had wanted us to travel such distances he’d have given us engines”. On top of this for some reason a few strong voices felt rail travel seriously harmed female reproductive powers.

20 year railway frenzy

The long running argument over locomotion versus stationary engines for traction ended once and for all at Rainhill. Worries over gradients, brittle track, weight distribution, the efficiency and safety of boilers and locomotive reliability on extended journeys, were all set aside. Plans began for proper stations and even passenger waiting rooms. A 20-year frenzy of railway building and development followed.

Waterloo Station clock

Tracks needed Parliamentary approval so lots of private bills were introduced. Many landowners were happy to have the benefit of railways. Others were fiercely opposed. Land costs were far higher than the US, where trains first ran on the Baltimore-Ohio line at the same time as Liverpool-Manchester. Each mile of track needed huge capital sums to be raised. Indeed many railway companies went bust.

Effects and legacy

Economic historians disagree on the extent of the railways’ role. But they clearly boosted activity, especially in the coal, iron, engineering and construction industries. Rail transport reduced transaction costs, lowering goods’ prices and increasing the variety of foods available.

But perhaps the most profound changes were in that area mentioned, and not really foreseen - the people element. In the 1820s each town kept its own time, and with limited contact between them, there was little need to standardise clocks. But regular rail services, especially long distance ones, needed agreed times, vital for an efficient business economy. Standard times throughout the country, creating a basis for proper working patterns, also boosted personal mobility. People could live away from their place of work, and even in time, go away on holiday.

Replica of 'Planet', Science Museum, London

The Stephensons were instrumental in these changes. Never satisfied with their latest model, they had a philosophy of constant learning and improvement. This ‘don't rest on your laurels’ approach typified the age of rapid change which followed, and which was so different from what characterised the previous cultural mainstream. Even as the revolutionary Rocket swept away the competition in 1829 at Rainhill, the Stephensons were working on a more advanced locomotive. It was a 2.2.0 model with internal front mounted cylinders set to the horizontal. A show stopper when launched in 1830, its design immediately became the standard. It was named Planet. From then on, the Rocket was obsolete.

1805 Trafalgar

Each year on October 21st, the Royal Navy hosts its commemorative dinner marking the anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar. A highlight of the navy’s social calendar, it celebrates Lord Nelson’s 1805 victory over the combined fleets of France and Spain, a crushing win for Britain, against more numerous and heavily armed opponents. So what were Trafalgar’s results? Did it prevent Napoleon from invading Britain, and did it shorten the war? Did bold new tactics destroy the French fleet? And did all the officers and men ‘do their duty’?

Trafalgar and the Napoleonic War 

Let’s take the points in order. One of the most persistent myths is that Trafalgar saved Britain from invasion. From early in 1805 Napoleon had spent months creating his ‘Army of England’, plus a vast fleet of transports to get the force across the Channel. But the Admiralty were watching closely and planning accordingly. Trying to pull France’s battleships together and get them into the Channel to cover an army crossing, Napoleon was blocked at every turn. On 22^nd July an engagement off Finistère saw Adm. Calder finally kill off this hope. Within a month Napoleon realised his plans wouldn’t work. He abandoned the project. This was two months before the battle of Trafalgar.

Battle of Cape Finistere, William Anderson 

So did Trafalgar shorten the war? Hardly, as the conflict continued for a further 10 years. Once Napoleon had left behind his British invasion plans, he moved against Austria. Hearing the Austrians were mobilising he quickly turned to his preferred style of land warfare, comprehensively defeating them with his biggest victory at Austerlitz. This took place six weeks after Trafalgar. Napoleon’s power then actually grew with big wins against Prussia, Russia and the invasion of Spain.

What about the supposed new battle tactics, the product of Nelson’s genius? Essentially the plan involved splitting the British fleet into two columns and attacking side on. The aim was to cut the enemy’s line and surround the middle section, with the van removed from the fight for some time. In fact these tactics had been used several times before, by other commanders as well as Nelson. No parts of the plan were particularly revolutionary. What Nelson did was to work it out in detail well in advance and share it in meetings with his officers.

Battle arithmetic   

Cape Trafalgar is on the coast of southern Spain. The Franco-Spanish fleet was of 33 battleships and 2,600 guns against the British 27 battleships and 2,100 guns. Total firepower was huge, amounting to 13 times that employed at Waterloo. In personnel terms the Franco-Spanish fleet was about 30,000 strong, nearly twice that of Britain’s 17,000. The size of the fleets, their weight of metal and the numbers of men involved certainly mark this as a great naval clash.

Admiral Villeneuve 

One column was headed by Nelson, the other by his deputy Adm. Collingwood. The French commander Adm. Villeneuve, guessed Nelson would adopt this battle plan, but he could do little about it. His fleet had turned from south to north, and was sailing in a fairly ragged crescent. Organising the French and Spanish elements presented problems. There was little wind, however, so the British columns, and particularly one of the lead ships, Victory, took severe punishment when approaching the enemy at barely walking pace.

Battle of Trafalgar, by Turner 

There followed the usual grim scene in battles of this era. With broken masts, sails and bodies, plus gun-smoke, little could be seen of any signals. Visibility beyond a few feet was all but impossible. Nelson had left individual captains to decide on actions according to the situation they faced. A sound policy, and the tactics worked largely as set out. After a few hours of close combat many of Villeneuve’s ships had been damaged and captured and the battle was effectively over. The Royal Navy had lost no ships but nearly 500 men - the Franco-Spanish fleet 22 ships and nearly 5,000 men.

The Nelson effect

One of the dead was of course, Nelson, hit by a musket ball. He was only 47, but already had a worldwide reputation. Some of this it has to be said was burnished by him, a shrewd and assiduous self-promoter. But he was still a great commander, and his brilliant performance in 1798’s Battle of the Nile could hardly be bettered. With his bold, and often rather daredevil approach, he had great qualities as a leader and was loved by his men. But it’s not true that his sailors at Trafalgar were battle hardened. Most had never experienced battle before. One in four had had less than a year at sea, and 10% were not British.

                                                               Admiral Lord Nelson

A storm soon after the battle forced Britain to scuttle most of the ships it had captured. Two days later, a daring sortie from Cadiz by some of the survivors re-took two of the ‘prizes’ from their British captors, and another, snatched from the prize crew, was wrecked later. So the net result for the Royal Navy was rather below the headline figures. And Nelson’s famous signal “England expects”... seemed not to galvanise everyone. Capt. Berry blazed away ineffectively and Collingwood’s flag captain reported frankly that some officers had performed “notoriously ill”.

Was the French Navy severely hit? No. France had another fleet at Brest and a squadron at Rochefort that were never committed to the engagement. And Napoleon was soon able to replace the lost ships by building new ones. By 1815 France had 80 capital ships, a net rise of 20 vessels. The real disaster was felt by the Spanish Navy which lost some of its biggest and most powerful ships, and perhaps more importantly, many of its best officers, including Trafalgar commander Adm. Gravina. This was a blow from which Spain never recovered.

Adm. Federico Gravina

Economic war

So a pretty long list of myths, or at least misapprehensions, about the event. What were the true results? Economic warfare followed in 1806 as France changed tack to the Continental System, restricting British trade with Europe. Britain applied a blockade on France and much of Europe and its global trade at first suffered from declining trade relations with the US. The Continental System ruined some French industries and caused a recession in French ports and among French allies. It backfired badly on Napoleon and led to numerous conflicts within his nascent Empire.

The blockade was perhaps unsurprisingly honoured extensively in the breach. Britain managed to ease some practical restrictions in order to import plenty of French wine and brandy. In return Napoleon allowed British made boots to be imported into France - he believed they were of better quality and wanted his army to have the best. But let's not generalise from the particular. In truth the blockade mainly held.

Now with control of the oceans Britain looked to expand trade outside Europe. It also grew its political influence in Latin America - having in 1807 evacuated Portugal’s royal family to Brazil. Trade with Latin America doubled in three years. Britain committed to Portugal, and after Napoleon’s invasion of the country, to Spain, sending and supplying an army under Wellington. Economic success allowed generous funding of European alliances that left Britain in the fight and eventually bore fruit. British money kept the Prussians in the field and helped bankroll the European alliances of 1814-15 which finally defeated Napoleon.

Says strategic historian Martin Robson, “Britain’s position in 1815 as the world’s only superpower was based upon setting the rules of global trade…insured in London and carried in British ships - but her aims were only achieved by engagement with European politics”. Trafalgar not only kept Britain solvent during a time of economic isolation from Europe, it allowed the country to compensate for lost European trade until the time was right to re-engage politically and economically with Europe.

Nelson's reputation

Perhaps most important of all, Trafalgar’s psychological effect was notable. The Royal Navy was shown to be stronger in training, professionalism and tactics than any rivals, though it had to fight limited actions to prevent ships of smaller European navies like Denmark's falling into French hands. Command of the seas generated the national confidence to build a global empire relying almost entirely on sea communications. Nelson’s unorthodox tactics were rarely repeated by later naval commanders. But the self-image of the Royal Navy - and the country - is bound up with his reputation.

Place names all over the world tell a story, if only a partial one. A French friend's father, a former ambassador, with delightful humour put it well. Travelling in a taxi through London several years ago, his young colleague exclaimed with astonishment, "But these are all battles we lost!"  

Adm. Cuthbert Collingwood

Nelson's body was returned to London after the event. Says naval historian Sam Willis, “Trafalgar was not defined by the strength of the British navy, but instead by the death of its greatest naval hero: Horatio Nelson. The events of October 1805 were celebrated both for the sheer scale of the battle, and the fact it was all wrapped up in the story of Nelson. His funeral was a national show”. Some aspects of his private life were unwelcome to the authorities' image building, so were airbrushed aside. But the ceremonial magnificence of the occasion, with the carriage resembling a warship, was stage-managed on an unprecedented scale. It was all designed to stiffen national resolve in the war against Napoleon. Nelson would have loved it.

1774-1783 American Colonies in Revolt

This seismic event is a foundation stone of US history - the American Revolution. It's the subject of thousands of books, articles, papers and lectures in America, if rather fewer in Britain, where it’s often been termed the American War of Independence. The different names conceal a variable framing of the episode, but as might be expected, each is loaded with myths. No doubt Americans can take care of their own myths, but several on the British side, and maybe on the conflict in general, need busting.

Seeds of rebellion

The Stamp Act, imposed in the British Empire on printed documents, was perhaps what most galvanised the American colonies. It was levied in 1765 on everything, from credit notes to newspapers. In fact the Americans paid only two thirds of what applied in Britain, and overall were generally lightly taxed in comparison. But Parliament’s Stamp Act imposed a charge on a literate colonist society that cost the most to the people best able to complain about it. The voice of outraged virtue - ‘no taxation without representation’ - soon followed.

Old State House, site of the 'Boston Massacre'

Historian Jill Lepore says “The sovereignty of the people, the freedom of the press, the relationship between representation and taxation, debt as slavery: each of these ideas, with origins in England, found a place in the colonists’ opposition to the Stamp Act”. But only 13 colonies actually rebelled. Defiance didn’t extend to Quebec or the Caribbean islands where the Stamp Tax burden was heavier, and where it paid the local defence costs. This was key. In the slave colonies fear of insurrection was ever present. And there was little about freedom for slaves in the ferment about liberty - one of the embarrassing issues of the time.

The Stamp Act was repealed in 1766 after only a year. But the genie was out of the bottle. Debt, taxes, slavery and equality became issues of intense debate. New taxes on lead, paint and glass saw British army units sent to Boston to enforce the law. This caused riots and boycotts and in 1770 troops killed five people in a town meeting (the ‘Boston massacre’). 

Sending the British Army

In 1773 the Tea Act asserted Parliament’s right to tax the colonies. The locals importing tea were called ‘enemies of the country’.The famous Boston Tea Party in December 1773 raised the stakes and in 1774 Britain turned the screw, closing Boston’s harbour. Parliament and the North government endlessly argued about how to react to the unrest. Could the trouble be contained or should they force the issue? Sending an army was not the sudden decision some believe. But to back down would be to lose the colonies, they thought. At last it was done. When in April 1775 a battalion was sent to destroy arms dumps at Lexington and Concord, near Boston, the local militia mustered, shots were fired and the first deaths of the war occurred.

Engraving depicting the 'Boston Tea Party'

In 1774 and early 1775 most people in the American colonies wished for autonomy within the British Empire, not independence, despite writer Tom Paine’s famous pleas. The Second Continental Congress still hoped for reconciliation with Britain but aggrieved radicals from Massachusetts, who had besieged Boston, won sympathy from even the reluctant southern delegates. Attitudes changed as Britain doubled down, treating the colonists as avowed enemies. In June Congress voted to set up a Continental Army with George Washington as commander.

Even then actually declaring independence was put off. Most colonists were loyal. If those from Scots-Ulster Presbyterian stock mainly backed independence, Anglicans mostly supported the Crown. Britain had a professional army and the world’s most powerful navy to supply its troops and blockade American ports. It was widely expected that Britain, with the financial muscle and infrastructure to fund a war, would win any protracted conflict. Part of London’s thinking was that the colonies, all with different systems and rules, found co-operation rather difficult.

Colonies work together

Still, the success of the Massachusetts militia in inflicting major losses on British troops on the Concord road and then at Bunker Hill encouraged the other colonies to co-operate. Without this morale booster it’s doubtful if a viable Continental Army could have been raised in the war’s first year. Just as well. 1776 went badly for the American forces, ending in defeat in New York and New Jersey. Britain's General Howe may at that stage have missed the chance to destroy Washington’s army, but his supply lines were stretched. And, still hoping for a negotiated settlement, he wanted to preserve the peace option.

Viscount Howe, Commander in Chief, British Land Forces

The Continental Army recovered and fought back next year. Congress stopped one year enlistments, so it was upgraded into a professional standing army. Washington at last had the chance to train and equip the force he wanted. In October 1777 Gen. ('Gentleman Johnny') Burgoyne surrendered an army of 6000 at Saratoga, in upstate New York - nearly 25% of British military strength in America. It’s a myth that it was the turning point of the war. Yet it did persuade France in 1778 to join the American side, and within three years this had tipped the scale.

Surrender of Gen Burgoyne's army at Saratoga

Declaration of Independence

During the fighting the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed on 4^th July 1776 in Philadelphia. Signed by Second Continental Congress President John Hancock, one of the colonies’ richest men, it took months to collect all 56 delegates’ signatures. An act of state, it was written to resonate within the law of nations. Arguments over the text were attenuated. Congress struck out a key passage, ‘assemblage of horrors’, blaming George III for slavery. As Jill Lepore brilliantly puts it, “The Declaration …was a stunning rhetorical feat, an act of extraordinary political courage. It also marked a colossal failure of political will, in holding back the tide of opposition to slavery by ignoring it, for the sake of a union that, in the end, could not and would not last”.        

Writing the Declaration of Independence - Franklin, Adams and Jefferson

Almost all slaves sided with Britain, seen as more likely to offer them freedom, as did about 20% of white colonists. Many ‘loyalists’ took up arms against their compatriots. Some 40% of the colonies’ 3m population were ‘patriots’, backing the rebellion and war. The rest, including most Native Americans, were neutral. At the end about 75,000 loyalists, including numerous ex-slaves, left for British ruled Canada and London. The rest stayed to make their peace with the new regime.

France's key role

France provided critical aid to the Americans with troops, naval support and money. Spain and the Netherlands would follow in 1779 and 1780. By that stage Britain emphatically saw the conflict in wider international terms, which concentrated minds in London. In 1778, after failing to crush the rebellion in New England and the mid-Atlantic region, they determined to end things once and for all. The ‘Southern Strategy’ that followed at first achieved impressive results. In 18 months or so British troops reinforced by Hessian mercenaries had defeated three American armies, retaken Georgia and much of the south, and seemed likely to win. Yet in 1780 guerrillas exacted a terrible toll on British and loyalist forces in South Carolina. Gen. Cornwallis then lost more men in North Carolina and Virginia. In October 1781 he was trapped at Yorktown and forced to surrender his 8,000 troops.

Rochambeau and Washington giving last orders at Yorktown

The war effectively ended there, where the French navy had decisively blockaded British forces. In these later stages the French, under Rochambeau, were largely dictating American strategy and tactics. In fact it’s worth pointing out that France had more soldiers and sailors at Yorktown than the Americans. From early on in the conflict France had provided arms, ammunition, warm clothing, and, crucially, money for the Continental Army. It was basic French policy - a way to weaken a traditional rival.    

Wider conflict and legacy

The American colonies were the first significant power grouping to detach themselves from Britain. The war in America may have been over, but not the wider conflict. A British fleet decisively defeated the French and Spanish in the Caribbean, and Gibraltar, besieged from 1779, held out to the end. This strengthened Britain’s hand in the peace talks held in Paris in 1783. There the American delegates had independence confirmed, but demanded all territory east of the Mississippi. France, though, wanted a far more restricted Appalachian frontier. In secret talks Britain happily accommodated the new United States.

Prime Minister Shelburne badly wanted a deal. He saw the potential of friendly relations with America, especially for trade. He was right. Britain sold more to the US after the war than before, and imported a new product, cotton, to supply the textile mills of Lancashire. Britain retained a major export market and access to valuable raw materials, without the attendant defence and administrative costs of an empire.

Lord Shelburne, by Sir Joshua Reynolds

Was the result of this war ever in doubt? Yes. The colonists could easily have lost in 1776 or in 1780 when defeat looked very likely. Poor strategy hurt the Americans, as well as an ill-fated invasion of Canada. By the time of the Yorktown surrender French tactical guidance had taken over to good effect. The colonies would have been independent in the end, of course, as indeed were Canada, Australia and New Zealand, all just too far away from Britain to be remotely run. But in the late 18^th century this was no certainty.

1750-1825 Agricultural Revolution

The term ‘revolution’ is surely used too freely. There are political revolutions, where the power structure is changed suddenly and comprehensively, and economic revolutions, with similarly major changes in that sphere. We see any number of social revolutions, and the term is extended to culture, notably in 1960s China, or even to fashion. We often refer back to the industrial revolution, and perhaps ahead to its future post-industrial version. But maybe less to a more gradual historical phase every bit as important - the agricultural revolution.

Tull seed drill, 1762

A problem to start with. People have disagreed about what’s involved, and when it happened. There’s academic argument about the timing and nature of agricultural revolution(s). Some say there were several - maybe four or five periods - that legitimately fit into a pattern of accelerated change. But this muddies the waters, perhaps making the subject too amorphous to tackle sensibly. Modern studies see it as a three stage, overlapping process. The period chosen here, from 1750, is sometimes called the ‘second agricultural revolution’, as demand for food rose rapidly, yet was generally met through big changes in technique and method.

Key characters?

Even if we agree on a period, there are some enduring myths. For 100 years or more, the British agricultural revolution was seen to be based on three key changes: selective livestock breeding, removal of common land property rights (enclosures), and new systems of cropping with clover. Leading the charge was a group of individuals – Jethro Tull, ‘Turnip’ Townshend, Arthur Young, Coke of Holkham, Bakewell and the Collings. Historians happily made them household names. 

2nd Viscount Townshend

But is it right to personalise the changes like this? Did these men, as we used to believe, triumph over peasants with stick in the mud ideas? Did they transform English agriculture from a backward subsistence economy to a thriving capitalist system fit to feed the exploding population of millions in the new urban areas? Well, there’s now general acceptance that the role of these 'giants of the agricultural revolution' has been, to say the least, exaggerated.

1st Earl of Leicester - Coke of Holkham

Townshend was only a boy when turnips were first grown on his estate. He couldn’t have brought them over from Hanover. Jethro Tull didn’t invent the seed drill, which in any case was not used widely until the 1830s. Coke of Holkham and Arthur Young, great publicists (and self-publicists), were later regarded as charlatans. Bakewell did breed fine sheep but his Longhorn cattle failed. 

Shorthorn heifer, a breed pioneered by Charles Colling 

Says historian Mark Overton “Only the Collings brothers, who developed the shorthorn cattle breed, can escape criticism. Despite this evidence, the myths associated with these individuals have proved extremely difficult to dislodge from literature not directed at a specialist historical audience”.

Feeding a growing population

The UK population grew very fast from 8m in 1750 to 11 million in 1801 and 14m in 1825. These people all needed feeding. So what were the main factors behind the high intensity agriculture from 1750? Adopting turnips, swedes and clover in crop rotation was key to making more use of arable land (such systems were in use in Flanders as early as the 16th century). It helped suppress weeds so farmers didn’t need to leave fields fallow for a season. It also put nitrogen back into the soil. The result in simple terms was more food from each field.

One factor often neglected is basic land reclamation. More upland pasture was converted to arable land, and forests cleared for pasture or planting. A major source of reclaimed land was marsh and Fenland draining and conversion. Here there was help from Flanders and the Netherlands where, due to high population density, farmers had long had to maximise every bit of usable land. It’s estimated that British arable land availability in the period grew by 20%-30% via this process of conversion and recovery. 

Enclosures and social change

The enclosure of land was another key development. By consolidating various plots into more efficiently farmed fields, better use was made of resources. From the 17^th century enclosure could be authorised by Act of Parliament, which became the norm. Landowners and bigger tenant farmers were boosted. Small tenants and farm workers were left landless. Socially polarising, this caused huge dissent and widespread distress. The process was nearly over by the end of the 18th century. Of course it created a base for much more efficient farming, but it left an underclass and a load of lasting social problems. It's worth noting that even today only a tiny proportion of the population owns Britain's land. 

Bridgwater Canal 

There were other influences at work, too. Improved transport with canals and turnpikes saw producers aiming at bigger markets, further from their base. A factor perhaps not stressed enough, it helped the shift from low to higher volume agriculture.

So more land for farming, and better use made of it. The mix of crops changed. As for selective breeding there’s no doubt some breeds of sheep almost doubled in size. And there were improvements in the size, quality and suitability of other sorts of livestock. But the total effect is hard to measure. There’s a great risk of generalising from the particular, and opinions differ as to the scale and timing of this effect.

Rise in grain output

There's perhaps more reason to be confident about grain production. The period from 1750 to 1800 saw large rises on the previous 50 years. Net crop yields per acre improved: oats (by 70%), barley (45%), wheat (25%) and peas/beans (40%). They’re fairly crude estimates but highlight the scale of these gains. 

Wheat, spelt, oat and barley

More detailed analysis is not possible - official analytical data on the sector was unavailable until the 1860s. Still, we know this rise was organic and sustainable. By 1825 with a rough balance achieved, chemical fertilisers and other external inputs weakened overall sustainability. Overton is clear. “An essentially organic agriculture was gradually replaced by a farming system that depended on energy intensive inputs”.

Scottish changes

In Scotland the process was different. Specialists in the subject tended to see it as long term change, ignoring the boom from 1750-1800. Glasgow and Edinburgh grew fast, boosting a move to single land tenancies and production for the market. It was structural - more productivity, based on longer rural leases, new tools and crops. A more effective use of land, and better organisation of resources. Farmers rose to the challenge, avoiding a Lowland equivalent of the Highland clearances.

Did this revolutionary improvement in agriculture and accompanying gains in productivity force people off the land to seek work in newly industrialising urban areas? Or the other way round, with agriculture learning to cope with less labour? A chicken and egg question still being debated. But it allowed the country’s population to achieve sustained growth. Britain, in truth, was never really a peasant society. But the changes in this period accelerated Britain’s early move to capitalist farming, and thus inexorably to its lead in the global industrial revolution.

1715 onwards -Jacobites

British history was periodically pockmarked between 1689 and 1759 by ‘Jacobite’ rebellions. Named after the Latin Jacobus for James, the term referred to the deposed King James II (and VII). The Jacobites aimed to restore the Stuart dynasty. Their rebellions started in Ireland and Scotland in the 17^th Century, spread to England, and then in the 18^th Century continued, strongly, in Scotland. In every case these involved France. The story finally ended in Rome.     

Jacobite origins and aims

But who were the Jacobites and what did they want? How was the idea and its movement sustained on and off for 70 years? While they seemed disruptive, did they ever get really close to overturning the British government? What and who made the Jacobites the subject of such a plethora of romantic stories, with toasts to ‘the king over the water’. And why are so many of the attendant myths still alive today?

When James II was deposed in 1688 many in Catholic Ireland fought to restore him to the throne. The theme was picked up in 1689 in Scotland by John Graham, Lord ('Bonnie') Dundee (or from his title to the Claverhouse estate, 'Bluidy Clavers'), depending on religious and political preference. He was killed at the battle of Killiekrankie. Things then seemed to settle down a bit until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession and its Treaty of Utrecht. One of the peace terms was that France would accept the British royal line. But in 1714 on the death of Queen Anne, under the Act of Settlement this went to the Hanoverian, George I.

John Graham, Lord Dundee

England and Scotland had been formally joined together in 1707 via the Act of Union. While Scotland’s dire financial and trading position at the time made this largely inevitable, many Scots opposed it. Scottish Jacobites saw a return of the Stuarts as a way of leaving the Union and replacing it by a looser confederate state with an Episcopalian church. Irish Jacobites mainly wanted Catholic institutions and a Catholic monarchy, with few if any links to England.

English Jacobites, if low in number, tended to believe in a more simplistic version of monarchical rights, and felt challenging the Stuart succession might set a precedent for other heritable issues of property and title. Some also simply disliked foreigners, especially the Dutch and Germans of whom they had had recent experience. In short everyone wanted different things.

The 'Fifteen'

The Jacobite cause's first main eruption in Scotland was soon after George I succeeded, in 1715. A force under the Earl of Mar confronted a government army under the Duke of Argyll. An inconclusive battle was fought at Sheriffmuir, but with indecisive leadership the rebellion fizzled out. This was really peak Jacobitism - a sizeable 22,000 were ‘out’. It was largely a Catholic affair, though, limiting its appeal to Scottish Presbyterians and Anglican Tory supporters in England. A rising in 1719 failed even more dismally, so backers felt it might be curtains for a Stuart revival.

John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll

After 1719 new laws imposed penalties on non-juring clergy ie. those refusing to swear allegiance to the Hanoverian regime. But retribution was generally muted. Bolingbroke and other backers were pardoned and came home, or moved elsewhere. France was not looking for trouble from Britain. Cardinal Fleury, French Chief Minister from 1723, viewed the Jacobites as ‘unreliable fantasists’ a view shared by most of his colleagues.

But by the 1730s, France was worried about British trade ascendancy and in 1743, during the War of the Austrian Succession, when most of Britain’s army was fighting on the continent, France and Spain agreed on a plan to restore the Stuarts. The aim was to make trouble at home for Britain and weaken its ability to fight on the other side of the Channel. The French would supply and fund a rising led by Charles Edward, grandson of James II, to reclaim for his father, James, the ‘three crowns’ of England, Ireland and Scotland. 

The 'Forty five'

In August 1745 the ‘Young Pretender’ sailed to western Scotland with half a dozen friends and raised his standard at Glenfinnan, where the picturesque railway viaduct now stands. There, instead of being acclaimed, he faced a cool reception with few of the locals offering support. Indeed, he was strongly advised to go home. Gradually however, with Charles promising substantial French backing, sections of some Highland clans joined up. The Jacobites soon took Edinburgh without a fight, which helped generate momentum. They followed the time honoured populist script - tell them in distortedly simple terms what they want to hear. So separatist appetites were fed. The first declarations? To dissolve the ‘pretended Union’ and reject the Act of Settlement’.

Charles Edward Stuart, dressing up

The rest is well understood history. Gathering recruits in Scotland they marched all the way to Derby, where in December they turned back. The Jacobite Army Council of 18 voted overwhelmingly for this. They had picked up little English support, despite marching through areas of some erstwhile Jacobite sentiment, like Manchester. And French help had simply not arrived.

Some still say that being only 120 miles from London, they should have carried on to victory. But in fact 12,000 trained government troops had been recalled from Holland, and another well supplied force was chasing them from the north. It was remarked on how forlorn Charles’ 5000 recruits looked. Most of them were more concerned with feudal clan rivalries in Scotland than who was king in London. Only two of the Jacobite officers wanted to carry on. No-one thought the Hanoverian regime would collapse, even had the rebels reached London. It’s quite inconceivable that they could have been successful.

Lord George Murray

Indeed, there’s a wider issue. A bare majority of their Army Council wished to invade England at all. Irish Jacobite officers Sheridan and O’Sullivan did need a full Stuart restoration to secure their aims, and Charles wanted especially to reclaim the English crown. But the Scots officers felt it was a bridge too far. Army chief Lord George Murray, an experienced soldier, thought it folly to go into England. They would lose, he said. Far better to consolidate and defend Scotland, then wait for the Dutch war to tire the Hanoverians, before coming to terms.

Culloden and the aftermath

The Jacobites fought their last battle on April 16^th at Culloden, outside Inverness. They’d picked up support on the way back north, but fewer than 5000 actually took the field. Some units missed it by hours, and others were asleep after a tiring forced march the night before. It’s a myth that they carried just swords. Most had French muskets. And it’s not true they were annihilated. While 1000 or so were killed some units withdrew in good order, joining others at Ruthven barracks.

Another myth is that this was a Scotland v England fight. Many Scots, including several Campbell units, fought for the government. There were also Irish and French Catholic units on the Jacobite side. And while most of the rebels were non-Catholic Highlanders there were Lowland units, too. Most fought in regiments, but the system was complicated by clan allegiance and the pressed participation of some clan tenants.

Battle of Culloden, April 1746

The aftermath saw 120 people, mainly deserters, executed, with 1000 transported. Others were freed. The treatment of prisoners and their families attracted wide sympathy, and turned the Scottish public mood against the government. Tartan and other cultural symbols were proscribed for years, with a determined attempt to stamp out rebellious roots. Road improvements resulted and the recruitment of Scots to the British army was accelerated. The Heritable Jurisdictions Act ended the residual feudal powers of chiefs over their clansmen, though in truth this system had long been losing its coherence.

Charles Edward

So what of ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’ the charmer? Brought up in Italy with a Polish mother, he spoke English after a fashion, as well as French and Italian. But he was a poor leader with no real interest in Scotland. Charles was also rather a showoff, who enjoyed acting and dressing up. French point man D’Eguilles took a dim view of him, as in fact did the Scots officers who disliked his haughty style. Despite his lack of military experience, after Derby Charles disdained their advice. They viewed him in turn with suspicion and hostility.

Charles had different priorities and wanted a different outcome from most of his officers and men. He’d not wholly shed the royal rights and entitlement  baggage from 100 years back. ‘Unwelcome and unwanted’ said one writer.  But with so many songs and poems romanticising him it’s easy to get a false idea. The change was perhaps due to wholesale Victorian re-imagining of Scottish history and culture - Burns suppers, highland games, tartans etc. The rather sentimental song ‘Over the Sea to Skye’, for instance, was not written until 1884.

Folk memory?

Memory of the event is often seen through a nationalist lens. And the Jacobites did use this in their recruitment. But it’s simplistic to the point of distortion to view Jacobitism as an early independence movement. Nationalism was one of its many features, including culture, power, religion, as well as the dynastic issue (the Stuart succession perhaps the least important). Social and religious factors, including clan structures and loyalties, also played a part. Indeed there’s no proper understanding of the subject unless the endless myths can be shed.

Charles Edward Stuart in 1785

Despite another half-hearted French backed initiative in 1759, the ’45 was really the last call. In 1788 Charles died in Rome, a drunken, embittered man. Probably the key fact about the ’45 is really how few were ‘out’. At most the rebel army was 11,000 - half those who’d risen in 1715. The feudal clan system had long been in decline, but many families had split loyalties. With a plethora of different agendas for different people it’s not surprising the whole thing collapsed. So it's puzzling that some writers are still peddling the idea that London was in a panic as the rising was very nearly successful. Did the '45 ever really have a chance? In a word, no.