Acknowledgements

Myths of British History

Below is a list of the main sources used in compiling this blog. Some are respected academic historians but not everyone. But they have all produced credible research and some fine, highly regarded work. If leaning on a key source I've tried to mention his or her contribution, including quotes. But it's not an exhaustive list. I am, of course, very grateful for all their hard work and insight, but apologise to those left off the list. This blog could not have been written without them.

David Edgerton

Rob Saunders, Marc Morris, Ian Mortimer

Paul Addison, Roy Jenkins

Jonathan Sumption, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto

Diarmaid MacCulloch, David Bates

Jill Lepore

Suzannah Lipscomb, Robert Hutchinson

John Guy

David Olusoga, Jo Murkens

Margaret Macmillan, Max Hastings 

David Reynolds, Christopher Catherwood

David Priestland, Duncan Weldon

Alex von Tunzelmann, Anthony Howe

Colin Newbury, Christopher Whatley

Richard Sandbrook, James Attlee

Frank Furedi, Matthew Sweet

Juliet Barker, Richard Cavendish

Mark Overton, Orlando Figes

Martin Robson, Sam Willis

The News Today

In 1985 American educationalist Dr. Neil Postman published a book, “Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business”. He said that today owed more to Huxley’s Brave New World, with people addicted to amusement, than to Orwell’s vision of public state control. Citizens’ rights were now exchanged for entertainment. TV news is “misplaced, irrelevant, fragmented or superficial information that creates the illusion of knowing something”, wrote Postman.

If anything this view has proved even more prescient in the 35 years or so since. These days, it seems, public interest in political, social and economic issues can only be sustained through media celebs and TV ‘personalities’. Leaders are chosen and gain electoral success just by being recognisable from their media exposure. The key quality is visibility, with a gift for the photo-op. And many people only look that far, if indeed they notice politics at all. As former Chancellor Ken Clarke said recently, “There is an increasing yearning for colourful theatrical personalities with simple solutions to complex problems. These individuals offer up scape-goats and easy ways out that save people from having to engage with a very confusing world”.

The Brexit disaster

This has reinforced the trend to populist politics and politicians. Eight years ago, in an attempt to appease one faction of the Conservative Party, a fateful decision was taken. Though Europe hardly figured in wider public priorities at the time, PM Cameron decided if his party won the election there would be a simple in out referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. The vote, and subsequent Brexit, has seen Britain decline from a successful, open outward-looking state, with good co-operative relations with Europe and the globe generally. It’s now economically and politically weak, angry with itself and pitied by the rest of the world. Some say a state nearing its own dissolution.

So what are the myths leading the country to this monumental act of self-harm? First the idea that Britain was being held back by an endless plethora of rules decided by the European Union, that if only the country could escape from, we’d all be better off. A ridiculous idea, of course. Britain had key opt outs as an EU member, including Schengen, and avoided joining the Euro. In fact the country had the best of all worlds with its whole economy - and financial services particularly - benefiting from the Single Market.

Populist myths

Extending the myths, those who led the Brexit charge promised ‘we’d take back control of our laws, our money and our borders’. But ‘we’ already had control of them. When shortened to ‘take back control’ it could mean absolutely anything. Like many such slogans, it offered an apparently simple answer to complex problems in an increasingly complex world. It appealed to the credulous, the angry and the disappointed. It was backed by tax exiles. And the list of broken promises is endless. Most notable was the wealth the country would gain (the government itself now predicts a major decline in GDP).

Former Deputy PM Michael Heseltine said, “Just take the phrase ‘Take Back Control’…The government is lurching from crisis to crisis, and it’s patently not in control”. Writer Nick Tyrone asserts, “Brexit was a revolution disguised by its champions as a minor change, all to free the country from an oppression that was always entirely imaginary, as well as to try and take advantage of opportunities that do not actually exist”. An absurd but recurrent belief among Brexiters is that any problem can be solved if the rest of the world would just reorganise itself to fit in with Britain.

Brexit was clearly based on a series of myths swallowed by enough people to force the issue. And despite a near 50:50 split in the 2016 referendum it has been delivered in a ‘hard‘, ideological version. Given the accompanying lies, its supporters have felt obliged to keep up the fantasies. Worse, under cover of the Covid-19 pandemic and Brexit, PM Johnson’s government is steadily weakening the constitutional props and institutions defining a liberal democracy. Sometimes dressed as emergency measures, Britain is being remade along populist authoritarian right wing lines.

Shafting Britain's constitution

The sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law are Britain’s constitutional keystones. Yet in 2019 Parliament was illegally suspended. There are plans to make judicial review harder, with the Law Society warning of a threat to curbs on ‘the might of the state’. The PM wants power to override judges. New laws against public protests, whistle blowers, government accountability, plus widening the scope of the Official Secrets Act are in preparation. The government threatens the independent Elections Commission, and new voter ID moves will hit those with no driving licence or passport. It wants to hobble bodies that may restrain the state, and to replace the Human Rights Act. It flouts laws and conventions at will - all to keep a grip on power. But threats to the Northern Ireland Protocol inspired European, and particularly US, pushback.

The process of debating and approving measures in Parliament is being regularly by-passed by ministers. There is little, if any parliamentary scrutiny. This worries growing numbers of informed people, including Sir Jonathan Jones, former head of the Government Legal Department. The ministerial code governing behaviour, and aiming to avoid corruption, is regularly broken. There’s no longer any independent adjudication. When Home Secretary Patel was earlier found to have breached the code there were no consequences and the matter was just dismissed. 

All this is not normal. It can’t be treated as just politics as usual. Cabinet and parliamentary government now barely exists. A small group of ‘courtiers’ surrounds Johnson, picked not for competence but loyalty to him and the Brexit lie. In the past if a minister lied in Parliament he had no choice but to resign. But Johnson and his colleagues lie prodigiously as a matter of choice. It’s worth stressing that this is not the Conservative party of old. Many of those members with moderate views and government experience were forced or eased out. Entryists from UKIP helped take control of several constituencies and some of these people are now serving ministers. The Conservatives have largely been transformed into populist UKIP-lite English Nationalists.        

Threat to democracy

It’s said that Britain’s constitution depended on people being ‘good chaps’. That with a covenant of mutual tolerance politicians would abide by unwritten rules and conventions. And until now, they mostly have. But when people who are not ‘good chaps’ take power, the fragile fabric is easily broken. Would a written constitution help? It’s worth noting that the USSR constitution was perfectly democratic in theory, but cruelly authoritarian in practice. And the USA still suffers huge gun violence dating from the right to use muskets in a rural 18^th century society. Perhaps a Bill of Rights would help, but there’s no easy answer.

Coups may occur without a bunch of colonels moving their tanks into the capital. Britain’s democracy is barely 90 years old, or only 75 if we ignore the national governments of World War II and the 1930s. H.A.L. Fisher in 1935 said, “Progress is not a law of nature. The ground gained by one generation may be lost by the next”. Historian Rob Saunders points out, “The first UK prime minister born under universal suffrage was John Major. Every PM from Baldwin to Thatcher saw democracies collapse or be crushed. That democracy is fragile is a lesson we forget at our peril”.

Corruption

Brexiters condemned endemic corruption in the EU. They promoted the myth that leaving would shield the UK against such taints. Instead the combination of Brexit and Covid-19 has given opportunities for a huge level of corruption in Britain. Establishing so called VIP lanes for procurement of personal protection equipment and testing capacity has resulted in around 50 companies awarded contracts without competitive tender. Many had no experience or competence in the field, though they had links with ministers or Conservative party donors. In one example 43,000 people were wrongly given a negative Covid test result. The sums involved are enormous - over £12bn. 

Legal challenges are proceeding against the government. The Major administration of the mid 1990s was crippled by sleaze, and the ‘cash for questions’ scandal. This pattern has returned but at a turbocharged level. Eye watering sums have been uncovered in paid consultancy lobbying by some MPs, completely against the rules. Several ministers and ex ministers have been implicated, too. The consequences have yet to be seen.

For anyone who didn’t realise, it’s abundantly clear that Brexit is a disaster. Nobody can cite one single benefit to Britain. Fewer and fewer people in recent polls now think leaving the EU was the right choice. The number should fall even further as the effects become clearer and Britain’s overall position deteriorates. The government keeps repeating the lies rather than face up to the truth. But once lies start they have to be kept going. It seems just too difficult politically to admit that the emperor has no clothes.   

Ameliorating the damage

So how to get out of the mess? Many find it hard to admit they were conned or foolish in supporting Brexit. In 2017 the security services concluded in private that the public had been shafted. Still, common sense and geography should dictate change. It’s impossible for Britain to re-join the European Union soon. But a step by step approach may help. First is to try and rebuild damaged relations with Ireland and the EU. Then Britain could cooperate with Europe on things like Erasmus and standards alignment with further moves to ease friction on trade and other areas of mutual interest. Gradually a more positive climate may emerge. No-one needs to admit folly. It gets everyone off the hook. But a change of PM is a sine qua non here. 

Meanwhile culture wars are a key part of Johnson’s divide and rule modus operandi. He has a group in Downing St stirring this pot - involving statues, misinterpreting history, music - indeed anything the media can work into a national dust up. Other japes are akin to putting up a two fingered salute to foreigners, especially if deemed to be part of the ‘liberal elite’. Straight out of the Trump playbook.  But it's not clear this is really effective.The culture war extends to Covid-19 too. The ‘libertarian’ wing of the Tory party recently had 100 MPs rebel against their own government on new pandemic safety measures. 

A more familiar pattern returned as the Tories lost a solid seat in a by-election with a swing of 34% against them. Polls confirmed Johnson’s public popularity rating was at its lowest ever level. Ministerial Xmas parties during the pandemic, when the public were bound by strict safety measures, cut through and hugely damaged him. On 12th December 2021 Sunday broadsheet ‘The Observer’ wrote: “It is a national misfortune that we have a man who is by far and away the worst post war prime minister in office at the time of the worst post war crisis. Johnson lacks any shred of integrity, is driven by ego and self interest, and has been prepared to mislead voters again and again. He is incompetent and embodies the entitled politician who sees politics as a game rather than a duty. He is utterly unfit to govern Britain” This view was common among former Conservative colleagues.

The future?

This is the final chapter of my blog. In a previous post I quoted Dean Acheson’s 1962 remark “Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role”. But it did develop a role, as a key member of the European Union. And a doorway to Europe for the United States. Offering a sound trading environment for Britain, recognising the UK's strength in financial services, the EU was a realistic and helpful political option for a medium sized, respected state.

Throughout its history Britain has overcome problems and mis-steps, many of its own making. But in 2016’s ill-fated referendum, a combination of lies, dark money from overseas and shocking media behaviour, lured the country into a mythical fantasy of past glory. Emotional, not rational, this disastrous choice began a sad period for Britain. Russian money was very likely involved. The former Russian ambassador actually claimed his country had got what it wanted. A modern democratic state has been all but taken over by a small group of extremists 'gaming the system' of lax media rules, with weak constitutional laws and conventions. All of Britain's authoritarian populism and corruption has resulted directly from it. Our history is respected. But it’s a hard road to a more hopeful horizon.

Britain and Europe

This whole question is still a running sore in British politics and culture. A polarising issue in a bitterly divided country. And despite, or maybe because of, Britain leaving the European Union in 2020, there seems little prospect of it going away. Some try to link an anti-European (previously called Euro-sceptic) mindset to a long national tradition, perhaps even to Henry VIII’s 16^th century break with Rome. But a short glimpse into the past, and even into quite recent history, shows this to be completely untrue.

Background

For thousands of years British history has been closely and intimately involved with Europe. From Roman, Anglo Saxon, Dane and Norman times England was in Europe, politically, economically and culturally. Under the Angevins it was joined at the hip to what is now France. In the Tudor, Stuart and Georgian eras it was always national policy to ally with others in Europe to stop any single state from achieving European dominance. This policy ran right through the 19^th and 20th centuries against Napoleonic France and a militaristic Germany. To maintain a balance of power in Europe was the age old foundation of British foreign policy. But it died overnight with 2016’s referendum.

Angevin empire around 1189

For some people, incredibly, the campaigning came down to ‘Britain versus Europe’. VE Day in May 1945 was to celebrate Victory in Europe, not ‘over Europe’. It’s extraordinary that such a point should need to be made, but there it is. With such a level of ignorance about British history, these myths and misperceptions can prove dangerous. It’s an image of the chap with the Union Jack waistcoat standing on the white cliffs of Dover shaking his stick at the European continent.

There’s no point trawling the well documented history of Britain’s European policy. Suffice to say that post war indifference to formal European ties - the focus was still on a former global role - gave way as Britain at last decided to join the European Economic Community ‘inner six’. But two applications in the 1960s were vetoed by French leader de Gaulle. He thought Britain insufficiently European and too tied to the USA to play a useful role as an EEC member.

Finally under the Heath Conservative government Britain joined the Community in 1973, at the same time as Ireland and Denmark. It’s important to realise the Conservatives were strongly in favour of the EEC, while anti sentiments were principally on the Labour side, especially among some trade unions. To deal with Labour divisions PM Wilson held a referendum in 1975. After some cosmetic steps to ‘renegotiate terms’ the country voted by more than 2:1 to remain. Most of the Cabinet and most Conservatives, including new leader Margaret Thatcher, campaigned enthusiastically to remain. 

Edward Heath with the CDU's Uwe Barschel 1972

Public opinion

From 1975 to 1992 Europe was not usually a major political issue for the public. PM Thatcher was a driver of the European Single Market policy. Britain, with its strength in service industries, hugely benefited from this. But the political extension embodied in the Maastricht Treaty and evolution into a European Union was being questioned in Britain, despite opt-outs from some aspects. Populist noises from the UK Independence Party began to echo round the land.

UKIP was not ‘Eurosceptic’. It demanded Britain leave the European Union. Its policies were simplistic and rooted in fantasy but it was noisy and found support in some key parts of the print media. It was also given disproportionate time on Britain’s broadcast TV and radio, notably the BBC, whose sense of ‘balance’ was to weigh ignorance and nonsense equally with facts and expertise. It served to legitimise a bad idea that few involved supported. In the 10 years when the EU and Brexit were regularly debated, the BBC’s weekly Question Time politics slot had 50 European Parliament members (MEPs), on its show. Not a single one wanted to remain in the EU. MEP Richard Corbett observed “British media systematically skewed the coverage of the EU and dreadfully misrepresented the European Parliament”.

UKIP had no MPs. But in the 1990s it gradually picked up mainly Conservative votes in local and European elections. Fearing Tory votes were leaching to UKIP and to try and avoid a party split, PM David Cameron sought to repeat Wilson’s 1975 plan - ‘renegotiation’ and a referendum. This was designed to fix his political problem and few observers believed he would lose it. With the 2015 election a referendum became firm policy and seemed to carry general support.

People's Vote anti Brexit march June 2018, London

For a long time polls had been showing the European issue was way down the list of priorities for most people. Typically, through the 1990s to 2010 only 5% or so claimed in opinion polls that Europe was the most important political question for them. It only became a burning issue nationally when Cameron promised to hold the ‘in/out referendum’ before 2017. The key Brexit theme among its supporters seemed to be ‘British exceptionalism’, the idea that Britain and its people were better than others and had no need to join any systems of rules.The country had always done ok in the past alone and would do again in the future. This was grabbed and intensified by the tabloid press, mainly owned and controlled by overseas-based tax exiles.

Crooked referendum

Lies, disinformation and illegitimate, hard to trace overseas money were a big part of the referendum process. Most of the Cabinet still campaigned to remain, with some key exceptions, though Labour’s unconvincing and ambiguous leader was very unhelpful to the Remain side. Yet Parliament supported the call for a referendum across the political spectrum. The vote might have stipulated a minimum 60% majority threshold, as do most constitutional changes, but it was left at a straight 50%. The result was a 52%-48% bare majority to leave.

The Conservative Party then virtually became UKIP in a matter of two years. It is a remarkable and unprecedented move, still barely understood, UKIP entryists effectively took over many of the local Conservative associations and virtually all pro-European MPs were forced out or decided not to stay. It amounted to a coup in all but name. The character of UK politics fundamentally changed overnight. And a winner take all ‘hard Brexit’ followed.

2016 referendum vote by age and education

Why the vote? It seems Leave support had little to do with economics. It’s perhaps too early for definitive explanations but research shows anti EU sentiment was strongest among older, socially and culturally conservative people worried about change. Immigration concerns were key as sometimes, was simple racism. In post referendum research, the correlation with authoritarian attitudes wanting simple solutions to problems - death penalty, child discipline, LGBT rights - was marked. There was also a large education divide - 70% of those with higher education voted to remain. The less educated voted strongly to leave.

Turkeys voting for Christmas

The combination of an aging population, economic dislocation from globalisation and deep social anxiety, with fears about immigration, proved enough. The people involved thought they had it better in the past. But as former Chancellor Philip Hammond insisted, this is the group who will be hardest hit by the changes. Indeed the evidence so far with 'supply chain problems' seems to bear this out. 

2016 referendum results by region

Vox pops on the Leave side were unedifying. “It’s what we voted for - we want it because we want it!” A curious, rather childish sort of psychology. Nobody has come up with any benefit from leaving the EU, a monumental self-disabling trauma. It affects trade, international services, farming, security and pretty well every aspect of British life. To give an idea of its importance, when Britain joined the EEC in 1973 the country’s total international trade (exports and imports) was under a quarter of real GDP. By 2018 that proportion had risen hugely to nearly two thirds. The government's own figures project a cut in GDP of 4% - a huge decline in Britain’s living standards, setting aside extra invisible costs. There’s just no point in it.

It’s worth highlighting that several other countries have had anti EU referenda results from time to time, after similar populist pressures. But they always managed to reverse such decisions with more accurate information than simple slogans like ‘Take Back Control’ and ‘Get Brexit Done’, when wiser counsels were allowed to prevail. In fact there were some huge public marches and demonstrations in London - at six million people the biggest ever seen - and petitions signed by several  millions of people demanding a Brexit re-think via a confirmatory referendum. These were turned down by the government, dominated by the extremist, referendum inspired, VoteLeave political and financial pressure group.

Recent 2021 polls showed only a minority - 30% and as low as 18% - of people still thought the Brexit decision was the right one. But that ship has sailed. Excluded from the EU single market and customs union no one convincingly claims any real benefits from a UK departure. State security organisations hinted that with dark money and misuse of data Britain was suckered into the vote to leave - but people don’t want to be told this. The influence of opaquely funded ‘think tanks’ trying to create an offshore archipelago of deregulated dark money is hard for people to understand. In any case too many of those in and around government were involved for any action to be taken.    

British Europeans, 2018

Says polling expert Peter Kellner on the Brexit vote, “Commanding that relationship to end and expecting not to suffer is as futile as commanding the waves to stop and expecting not to get wet. Britain is now discovering the dismal reality of ‘taking back control”. The EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Treaty of December 2020 effectively secured EU dominance in trade over Britain, and opened the door to increased EU access to areas like financial services where Britain has been strong and has run a large surplus. As a ‘rule taker’ Britain has no power in setting commercial and trading regulations. With the likely crumbling of both pillars of British foreign and security policy - Europe and the United States - the overall costs to the country from this self-harm, including the loss of influence and prestige, are truly incalculable.

Long nightmare

As conservative historian and editor Max Hastings said, “The issue of Europe has not merely poisoned Britain’s politics, but induced a drugged stupor in many of its people. They have embraced a nostalgic vision that some of us fear will deny us a stake in the most important and exciting things the world will achieve in the years ahead. We have voted to become a theme park”. In fact everyone cherishes sovereignty, but the British approach is outdated and simplistic. The world's problems - from climate change to security, from Covid-19 type pandemics to international terrorism - are now multilateral.

Brexit cartoon 2021

It cannot be said that any true awareness of history played a part in the decision to leave the EU, which could well de-legitimise the UK. Maybe there was some dim idea of a historical myth. But then the whole of Brexit is a pile of myths from bendy bananas to controlling Britain’s borders and laws. That change of this magnitude can happen in a populist surge on such flimsy pretexts, with the added chance of United Kingdom disintegration, is clearly a huge cause for concern. It could prove to be a long nightmare for the country.

The Iraq War

Which war? It’s a question you may fairly ask. During World War I in April 1916 an Anglo-Indian army surrendered to the Ottomans at al-Kut in what was then called Mesopotamia. It marked the end of a disastrous campaign to take Baghdad. 13,000 Empire prisoners were marched to Aleppo and many died en route. Historian Christopher Catherwood called it “the worst defeat of the Allies in World War I”, Jan Morris “the most abject capitulation in Britain’s military history”. But 10 months later a fresh Indian army recovered al-Kut and took Baghdad.     

Starving Indian soldiers after fall of al-Kut 1916

Modern day Iraq was under strong British influence from the end of World War I after 1916’s infamous Sykes-Picot accord. It continued in the 20s and 30s under a League of Nations mandate and even after nominal independence in 1932. But in 1941 four Iraqi officers seized power and made overtures to Nazi Germany. The threat was clear - to shut off the oil supply - the reason Britain wanted effective control. A scratch Allied force with ghost tanks and a few aircraft recovered Basra, then Baghdad and the oilfields, driving out the coup leaders.

Kuwait invasion

The next occasion of British military intervention was in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Britain joined a US led 35 nation coalition in the Gulf War ‘Operation Desert Storm’ to clear Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. It was achieved quickly and sanctions were applied to curtail Iraq’s military capacity, notably its production and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These were chemical and biological warheads and had been used against the Kurds. In genocidal attacks on regime opponents - the ‘Anfal’ - perhaps 200,000 were killed.

Ground troop movements, Gulf War 1991

These WMD warheads had also been used against neighbours in the Gulf War, and against Iran in an earlier conflict. And Iraq had adapted Scud rockets with a longer range. So a detailed programme of weapons inspection was started, along with US and British enforced no-fly zones, to protect vulnerable groups in both northern Kurdish areas and in southern Iraq. 2003’s conflict was really a continuation of the 1990 Gulf War with weapons inspectors, sanctions and no-fly zones maintained against a rogue regime universally regarded as dangerously brutal.

Sykes-Picot agreement map, May 1916

Fighting in Iraq

So Britain was no stranger to fighting in Iraq. It had been doing so off and on for 90 years. And given the history, particularly under Saddam Hussein, when UN weapons inspectors were first admitted, then expelled, then re-admitted to Iraq but then harassed in 2002, there was widespread concern about what might happen. Major abuse under the Oil-for-Food programme caused over 100,000 children to die when Iraq’s government diverted money earmarked for food and medicines. Saddam had a dreadful record and was cruelly untrustworthy.

There’s little point in going over the 2003 Iraq invasion by a US led coalition, supported by Britain, that overthrew Saddam Hussein. Huge amounts of written material have been generated including evidence from several enquiries. In summary the attack was launched in March and within a few weeks Baghdad, and most of the rest of the country, had fallen to the Coalition. The capital saw a widespread outpouring of public gratitude to the invaders. But as a precursor of what was to come, a wave of civil disorder, crime and extensive looting followed. 

WMD enquiries

The Iraq Survey Group of specialist weapons inspectors came in soon afterwards to conduct a detailed, thorough search of the country, but found no evidence of either a store of WMDs or an active capability of making them. They did find chemical weapons in a degraded or damaged state left over from the 1990-91 Gulf War, and some basic laboratory facilities not recently used. They found “clear evidence of his (Saddam’s) intent to resume WMDs as soon as sanctions were lifted”. They also found evidence that chemical weapons had earlier been transported to Syria. 

                                                US marines during the Battle of Baghdad

Given the UK investigations held on the British role, including Hutton and Butler, you would be right in thinking the reasons for Britain’s involvement were questioned. The country was in coalition with several nations, namely the US, Australia, Spain, Poland and others. UK critics seemed programmed to call everything a ‘whitewash’ demanding enquiry after enquiry, until one came up with the answer they were looking for. This was part of a growing appetite for conspiracy theories, which, largely through social media, has characterised the 21^st century and is much in evidence today.

Support and opposition

What were the reasons for Britain joining the US and a wider coalition to remove Saddam Hussein? Iraq’s presumed possession of WMDs, and the maintenance of the facilities to produce them, was the main one. Saddam’s appalling human rights’ record, attacks on neighbours and his unhelpful attitude to the UN inspectors reinforced the case. As the US was going to invade anyway, Britain might have deemed it right to help its foremost ally and guarantor of its security. There could also be an opportunity for Britain to use its knowledge and experience of Iraq to try and influence US decisions for the better. This does not seem an unreasonable rationale.

A widespread and persistent myth, particularly among Britain’s left, is that Tony Blair's government lied about the reasons for invading Iraq. It was a stitch up with the Americans - it was really all about oil, and exerting US power in the Middle East. But the Conservatives supported the action, as did Parliament. Still, accusations of bad faith were and continue to be levied. But why would the Blair government base its case on something it knew to be untrue when it would soon be demolished by events? It makes no sense at all.

Imagine the furore and consequences if governments had suspected WMD in Iraq, and Saddam then used these against his neighbours, or the UK and its allies. Many other countries’ intelligence services also believed Saddam had WMDs but their governments were unable or unwilling to do much about it. It was surely morally just for Britain to join the US and others to get rid of an evil and brutally murderous dictator. His record on using chemical WMDs on Iraqis and on other countries was atrocious. If you genuinely believed Iraq had WMDs, as the intelligence suggested, could you have just done nothing?

Bush and Blair 2006 

So lies? Hardly, though Blair himself said he should have questioned the intelligence more thoroughly. Was it illegal? Under unanimous UN Resolution 1441 Iraq was given a final opportunity to comply with its obligations and disarm or “face serious consequences” of failing to disarm. International lawyers still differ on whether this interpretation meant force would be the result of non-compliance.  

Aftermath of mistakes

Everyone agrees the aftermath was disastrous. The US Defense Dept took charge of Iraq’s post-invasion government, first under retired Gen. Jay Garner for three weeks, then with Paul Bremer for a year. Two calamitous decisions were made. Iraq’s armed forces, expected to be reorganised under the new authority, were disbanded. Hundreds of thousands of trained men with no jobs or earnings were suddenly unleashed. The other mistake was to dismiss every member of Saddam’s Ba’ath party, down to minor officials and 40,000 teachers who’d joined the organisation to keep their jobs. With no effective administrative structure it was chaos.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was soon under attack as an insurgency grew, with weapons supplied by former Iraqi Army and Republican Guard soldiers. Religious radicals joined in with sectarian attacks on opponents. Much of Iraq was soon ablaze as US and UK troops remained amid UN efforts to stabilise the country and create a viable state able to defend itself at home and from outside forces.

  Sunni Arabs

  Shiite Arabs

  Sunni Kurds

  Assyrians

  Yazidis

  Turkmen

Ethnic/Religious Groups in Iraq

Hindsight is 20:20. The Chilcot Enquiry into Britain’s involvement in this episode was set up in 2009, but reported more than seven years later in 2016, 13 years after the event. It produced 12 volumes of material, but was criticised for the time it took, that it had no soldier or lawyer as a member, and that it interviewed only four Americans and not a single Iraqi. It was expected that the report would be critical of the government. It was, but maybe not to the extent demanded by the harshest critics, even though it released unprecedented transcripts of telephone calls between Blair and US President George W Bush.

Chilcot strongly criticised the intelligence services, and said the legal basis for war was far from satisfactory. The UK overestimated its ability to influence US decisions, and planning and preparation, particularly for the post invasion period, was wholly inadequate. But it did not question Blair’s belief in the case for war. Acknowledging that Chilcot criticised the preparation, planning and the US relationship, Blair said it “should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies and deceit…whether people agree or disagree with my decision to take military action against Saddam Hussein, I took it in good faith and in what I believed to be the best interests of the country”.

Post Iraq

At the time of the action, a majority of the public in Britain, the US and Iraq supported the invasion. The Blair government was returned with a sizable majority in 2005 as well. Also in that year, the UN unanimously passed the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) resolution - a global commitment to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It’s a framework to employ measures to prevent such crimes and protect civilians from them. The authority to employ force rests with the UN Security Council, which is subject to veto by authoritarian China and Russia. So it’s considered a measure of last resort.

After 18 years - with different governments and leaders, and periods of near civil war, with heavy involvement by Iran’s theocracy, and parts of the country having been under prolonged occupation by extremist Islamist fanatics ISIL- the search to build a secure and peaceful Iraqi state continues. But even here it’s possible to argue that given what’s happened in Syria, non-intervention may have higher costs than intervention. It serves to remind us that in international affairs, especially those with a strong religious element, and/or brutal authoritarian regimes, there are rarely easy answers.

1980 onward - Britain's industrial decline

Sooner or later in a train, at a shop or in a bus queue, someone will pipe up, “I don’t care what anyone says, we still have the best (fill in for taste - planes, cars, football team…) in the world”. A few will join in to reinforce the point with their own mismatched examples while others just nod approvingly. Some misty-eyed dropping of brand names which are no more, and assertions that Britain no longer knows how to make things. Fruitless, perhaps, to try and disentangle the economic facts from the nostalgia, but let’s try.

After World War II and into the 1950s Britain was a relative industrial powerhouse. In 1952 the country’s factories accounted for a third of national output and a quarter of global manufacturing exports. 40% of the UK workforce was employed in making things. Today the sector employs only 8% of the workforce, and manufacturing is barely 10% of GDP. In its place is a service economy - offices, banks, cafes, call centres and supermarkets selling mainly imports. What happened? And should it be a worry?

Post war industry

When Britain emerged from World War II it had a technological lead in such fields as aerospace, aircraft, communications, computers and electronics, all turbocharged in wartime. It would take time and effort for Europe, including notably a defeated Germany, to build a competitive position. But a series of poor UK decisions followed. Comet, the world’s first jet airliner, launched in 1952, suffered from metal fatigue, barely understood at the time. After a number of crashes and hundreds of lost lives, the plane had to be redesigned and remodelled. By 1958 when it was relaunched, it was behind US planes in cost and capacity.

Comet I prototype 1949

This was a warning of things to come. The elegant VC10, designed especially for flying to Commonwealth countries with short runways, found little commercial success. The Trident, too, designed for just one customer, failed on the world market. National airlines BOAC and BEA were leant on to buy British. Other nations weren’t buying. But Britain had quietly built the nose of France’s Caravelle jet. Was this a sign of the future?

Decisions in the aircraft sector (and in other areas) were often based on what may be termed ‘imperial overhang’, an unconscious need to serve far flung centres of British influence. But Concorde was a change. A Franco-British high tech, international supersonic airliner project, it broke with the ‘world beating British’ mentality. But its noise rendered it unacceptable elsewhere. It was designed for an elite, not a mass market, and its high fuel consumption made it uncompetitive. Only 20 were built. Once again Britain had backed the wrong horse.

Change in Britain's industrial structure

National pride was influencing these decisions. What was needed was a sound business strategy with efficient production to sell in a future global market. And a reorganised British Aerospace did sign up to Airbus with France, Germany and Spain. In 2000 this was revamped into an integrated company to build the world’s largest airliner, A380. For a while BAe was happy with its 20% stake, but in 2006 it sold out to EADS, so has not benefited from Airbus’ success since. In fact Britain is now effectively a fringe player in this whole industry.

High tech projects

It's a myth that advanced industries now need only one country. A series of major high technology prestige projects were backed, then cancelled, from the 1960s onward. They include TSR2, the Blue Streak rocket, and various satellite systems. In video coding, Britain backed the discarded BMAC standard. Off the radar, in the late 80s the government considered backing a British designed and built telecoms switch. These are hugely expensive (£billions) projects that absorb much time and high-tech capacity. But a detailed study found that 70% of the components would need to be imported. The world of globally agreed standards, specifications and protocols was more complicated than the government had imagined. International partners were needed, not a ‘British switch’, world beating or otherwise. 

Conservative governments in the 1950s had a rather laissez faire view of large industrial projects, often spiced with an imperial mindset to back UK companies. And from the mid-60s Labour tried unsuccessfully to create national champions in industries deemed essential to the economy. Scale was seen as key. Industrial economist Geoffrey Owen says, “There was a mistaken assumption that there were certain technologies which a country somehow needed to have, and that they were more likely to be acquired through centralised direction than through competitive markets. The cost to the taxpayer of ill-judged industrial policy was high”. 

'Horizontal' policies and 'market failure' 

Things switched again in the 1980s, with the new Conservative government, to ‘horizontal’ policies. Liberalisation and deregulation would improve the environment for all firms. Privatisation was a key component of this approach. Still, many private companies went bust or were reorganised with global partners over the next 20 years. It wasn’t just smokestack sectors that went. Big names like GEC and ICI disappeared, as did the British car industry, though it survived as a thriving international version.   

Disappearing British industrial giants

‘Market failure’ was usually cited as a key problem. In the 1980s common wisdom said that left to themselves, markets would allocate resources efficiently, a rather simplistic 18^th century type of notion. This is another catch-all myth. In modern practice, with innovative industrial development, companies might not have the resources for costly research and development. This may bar entry to suitably qualified firms, or if they take the risk, simply hand the benefits to competitors.

The 1988 White Paper ended most support for single company R&D and placed its emphasis on a collaborative approach. It retreated even further into the catch-all of market failure. Industrial policy writer Alex von Tunzelmann says while you can sometimes blame market related costs for the fundamental shortcomings of policy making, “it doesn’t mean that providing a market would have resolved the problem identified - often indeed it might have exacerbated it”.

Complex decisions and a blame culture

BMC rosette

It took a while to realise the complexity of policy choices. Industrial strategy could not be based on backing winners or on seed money for innovative start-ups that might pay off. A more basic reason for failure was inadequate collaboration and what might be termed inter systemic issues - breakdowns between national spheres of science, innovation, finance, training and workplace organisation. Thus it was really a failure of alignment of the key factors. It gave rise to a mythical blame culture in Britain - 'the government and/or the banks didn’t back it'.

From the late 80s and 90s something resembling the right balance between competition and cooperation was developing, with partial liberalisation of previously protected sectors like telecommunications and electricity. Much of this was pursued in Europe via the Single Market which opened up a far bigger range of opportunities. New institutions - the Framework Programme and Eureka - were set up to promote intra-European cooperation in research. They have largely worked well, in contrast to some catastrophic UK government IT failures.

Europe's Eureka programme logo

There's a pot pourri of reasons for Britain’s industrial decline. Short termism in finance, misplaced belief in imperial trade patterns, being slow to seek international partnerships to spread costs and tackle global markets, and, of course, changes in fashion and society. But erratic government policy must take a share of responsibility. The last few years has seen a debate - is it time for a more active industrial policy? There is also wide agreement that what industry needs most is continuity, with a consistent focus. Brexit has scuppered that.

The services alternative?

In the 1980s Chancellor Lawson asserted that services would pick up the slack from industrial decline. He called the case for manufacturing “special pleading dressed up as analysis”. In fairness the development of services was inevitable. Britain is not alone - most advanced economies in the last 25 years have seen a big switch to services. But being able wholly to replace manufacturing is a myth. And Britain may have rather overdone it. Economist Robert Skidelsky shows that a huge rise in financial services has led to more short term thinking. Investors want quick returns, so companies spend too little on R&D with insufficient emphasis on management and advanced production.

Chancellor Nigel Lawson 1985

Manufacturing protects against per capita income deterioration as it’s more productive than most services. The greater the number of people employed in labour intensive, especially retail services, the lower the typical income is. The ‘not invented here’ syndrome has fortunately gone. And there are several successful industries where British companies have a large stake - in pharmaceuticals for instance. But Britain’s government had a serious structural deficit in 2008’s crisis, and the country was worse hit than those with more diverse economies. This over reliance on financial services gives the UK an unbalanced portfolio. And it may get worse.

1979 The Thatcher Effect

When Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in May 1979 it marked a break point in British history. She was, of course, the country’s first woman PM, and among the first in Europe. But her election also represented a systematic rejection and reversal of the post war political consensus, where the main parties agreed on the principles of Keynesian economics, the welfare state, a balanced mix of public and private sectors, and close regulation of the economy. The main exception to this was to be the National Health Service.

Margaret Thatcher 1983

The 70s was a tough time for Britain, with deep economic and social divisions, a declining industrial base and bad work practices. Rampant inflation, inefficient state-owned companies, government deficits, low investment and worker unrest typified the period. What’s not always realised is that other industrialised countries were hit by a permutation of these same factors. As historian David Priestland says, “It was clear that economies needed to be retooled to take account of a new economic environment. The question was how was this to be achieved.”

The new economy

Thatcher’s 1979 election win followed a minority Labour government that ended after the ‘winter of discontent’. Official and wildcat public sector strikes, at their most graphic with coverage of the dead going unburied, made it seem Britain was ungovernable. Thatcher’s prescription was theoretically based on the monetarism of Friedrich Hayek - inflation was caused by too much money in the economy, so the government must control the money supply via interest rates and financial discipline. Free markets and privatisation were then added to the recipe.

Milton Friedman

Hayek and Milton Friedman’s Chicago School ideas were doing the international rounds. And Britain certainly needed a jolt. But the fate of erstwhile major industries like cars, ship-building and mining was sealed even earlier, with some hard decisions postponed against a background of developing globalisation. It’s worth pointing out it was not just Thatcher supporters who wanted stricter control of inflation. By 1979 Labour Chancellor Healey had already adopted some monetarist policies like cutting public spending and selling the government’s stake in oil company BP.

A common view of Thatcher’s macroeconomic performance is that things were handled well, but the Major government messed it all up. This is simply untrue. While ‘supply side’ measures and some structural reforms had a positive impact, her macroeconomic policy was pretty diastrous. High interest rates, an overvalued pound, and a deep recession caused huge unemployment. By contrast the Major government, says Duncan Weldon, “eventually stumbled into a macroeconomic framework that appeared to work.”

Monetarism?  

A related ideological misperception is that Thatcher's government was monetarist. In theory maybe, but in practice it was not. 1980’s Medium Term Financial Strategy guiding policy from 1979 to 1983, had targets to reduce growth in the money supply. These were overshot, so in 1982 they were revised upwards, rather moving the goalposts. A broad definition of money known as M3 continued to exceed its target. Public borrowing was kept in check by the balance sheet ruse of netting off privatisation proceeds. In 1985 money targets were moved to a narrow range and then quietly dropped completely. Purists rightly claimed monetarism had been abandoned.

Miners' strike rally 1984

The government did believe in supply side economics. It intervened to create a free market by lowering taxes, privatising state industries and restraining the power of trade unions. The 1984-85 confrontation with the miners’ union (NUM) was the key trial of strength in this sphere. Scargill’s miners were defeated, a clear victory for the government. In fact laws to check union power were among a raft of measures used to improve the economic environment generally. They were retained by her successor, and later, by the 1997 Blair government.

Boom and bust 

Reduced demand in the economy and high unemployment especially in industrial areas, plus a strong pound, had helped reduce inflation to 3% by 1986. The government then thought it had slain this dragon so it could re-heat the economy. Interest rates and taxes were cut, creating the late 80s boom. But by 1990 inflation had risen to over 10%. It took a new squeeze and near 15% interest rates to bring it down. Recession, then unsustainable boom, followed by another recession, is hardly a good record. But it’s the Thatcher legacy. Stop-go, or boom and bust. And rather against common wisdom the tax take as a share of GDP remained at around 40% throughout the period. 

The main Thatcher policies were deregulation, privatisation, trade union marginalisation, reduced public spending, tax cuts and moving power from local authorities to central government. Thatcherism, a term barely used by Thatcher herself, was neatly summarised as “the free economy and the strong state”. The wolves often gorged on the sheep. Libertarian in outlook, it relied on a streak of authoritarianism in practice. And liberty was not spread equally. As Isaiah Berlin had remarked “Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows”. 

Political salvation

The economic shock to Britain from Thatcher’s election in 1979 was probably necessary. But it was carried out in a socially divisive way. Unemployment grew fast as austerity budgets and high interest rates hit industry hard. But the Thatcher government did much to help the City of London, with a structural shift from industry to finance that Britain is still struggling to manage. In 1982 with 3m jobless and low opinion poll ratings her economic policy was widely criticised publicly and in government. She would probably have lost the 1983 election, other things being equal, but was clearly saved politically by the 1982 Falklands war.

Some think that Thatcher’s economic policies were a success. While the early jolt was important, psychologically as much as anything, Britain’s growth rates in the 1980s were scarcely higher than those of the 70s. They could even have been lower without the windfall from North Sea oil coming on stream. It’s true that productivity rose by 11% in the period, mostly due to high unemployment. Compared to countries like Germany, though, where productivity rose 25% with little industrial or social damage, the UK figures were disappointing. Indeed the key period of sustained growth was from 1993 to 2007 under the Major and Blair governments, well after Thatcher.  

Anti poll tax rally 1990

Apart from trade union law to free up labour markets, the only policy to have brought some lasting measure of success is the privatisation of industries like gas, electricity and telecoms, though clearly not all have worked out well. It’s a key part of the Thatcher legacy as this model has been taken up by most countries around the world, including the European Union. Even France, slow to relinquish state control, is largely on-side.

Housing policy

Against this the council house sell-off had drawbacks that have now become clear. There are many reasons for today’s acute housing shortage - demographic change and life expectancy, the rise in single person households, variable planning rules and rising expectations - but the absence of a municipal housing supply is crucial. One reason for the ballooning UK welfare budget is the huge sums the state has to pay to private landlords (including those who now own a large proportion of the ex-council houses). An astonishing 51% of private tenants in 2020 had their rent paid from benefits.    

The housing shortage and other structural problems in the economy were not so clear during the 1990s and 2000s. The consequences of a lack of infrastructure investment and an imbalance from an overload of financial services were largely hidden. It was only in 2008 with the global financial crisis that the true state of Britain’s economic affairs was evident. The country was left with a problem legacy. It was a most uncomfortable realisation. Says Priestland, “The model built by Thatcher was being sustained by debt”.

Thatcher in balance

Some Thatcher plus points. She used shock tactics to shake the British economy in the 80s, against common wisdom. She took on the unions to boost the economic supply side, and put Britain in the international vanguard of deregulation and privatisation. A committed campaigner to stay in the then EEC in 1975, she was a driver of Europe’s Single Market in the 80s. Firm in the Falklands crisis and brave when the IRA bombed her hotel during 1984’s Conservative party conference, she was a strong, driven personality and always hard working.

Oil drilling platform, North Sea

Against this her economic policies became inconsistent and after a dramatic start yielded poor long term results, especially in housing. She took the credit for successes but blamed others for failures. Not a consensual figure, she fell out with colleagues like Michael Heseltine, Nigel Lawson and Geoffrey Howe. She was lucky with her enemies, like miners’ leader Scargill and Argentina’s Galtieri. She was aggressive, and determined. In her third term she listened less, and became more truculent in both European and domestic spheres, pushing a disastrous Poll Tax against advice. Successor John Major later said she was “a profoundly unconservative” figure with “warrior characteristics”.

It’s been claimed that the advent of the Social Democrat Party which with its Liberal allies won nearly 25% of the vote in 1983’s election, prevented Labour from gaining power. This is an abiding fantasy of the left. Detailed analysis has convincingly shown that idea to be wrong. Tony Blair later wrote “Britain needed the industrial and economic reforms of the Thatcher period”. Many fair minded people might agree. But the belief in a property stake shows up badly today, when young people can’t get their foot on that ladder.  

Margaret Thatcher during 1990's leadership vote

The basic Conservative contradiction is clear. A thrusting 19^th century Liberal idea, breaking social, technical, economic and legal barriers to grow business? Or a provincial, traditional Toryism, with local links, social bonds and inherited wealth? They’re in conflict, as are related themes of enterprise and nationalism. British initiatives now often come from immigrants via a cosmopolitan London, bypassing much of the UK which sees an erosion of traditional values. Thatcher never squared this circle. She's a divisive figure - not as good as her fans claim and not as bad as her detractors say.