1938 Munich Agreement

The Munich Agreement in September 1938 was surely a pivotal moment in European history (and a rich source for those engaged in counterfactuals). The issue was a genuine one of war or peace, and if things had taken another course the world’s history might have turned out quite differently. The episode was far more critical, for instance, than the short and one sided British War Cabinet argument - portrayed in films and books - with Lord Halifax seeking Italian mediation in May 1940.

One of the Maginot fortifications in northern France

But a huge myth has taken root which even now is still widely believed. It’s that Nazi Germany was so militarily strong in October 1938 that Britain and France had no alternative but to buy time to prepare for the coming conflict. This is totally untrue. At the time of the Munich Agreement the Nazis were actually weak - economically, militarily and politically. But the seizure of Czechoslovakia so transformed Germany’s fortunes that within 18 months it was effectively able to take on both Britain and France. So if any time was bought, it was to Germany's benefit.

Background to the crisis

Through the spring and summer of 1938 Czechoslovakia was the main European flashpoint. Hitler had never accepted the legitimacy of this state, which had emerged from the 1919 Versailles Treaty. The Nazi propaganda machine was turbocharged for an onslaught on the Czech government’s supposed mistreatment of about three million German speaking people in the Sudetenland - western border areas in Czechoslovakia.

Konrad Heinlein

The Sudeten leader, Heinlein, wanted first, special privileges and then, unity with Germany for the Sudeten German people. In this he was supported and largely directed by the Nazis from Berlin. Hitler became more and more bellicose on this issue, which he was clearly determined to force as the summer wore on.

France had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, but was clear that it would only fight to defend the country if Britain came in on its side. The Soviet Union had a friendship treaty with the Czechs but its military data is not included here partly because it is unclear on what conditions the USSR would have fought and partly due to the unreliable figures. But adding them to the total would make the case even more unassailable.

Balance of forces - telling arithmetic

Historian Richard Evans' detailed and comprehensively researched work here sets the standard. It’s important to recognise, but usually ignored, that Czechoslovakia at the time, if helped by Britain and France, was ready and willing to fight. Its military strength: 1.5m men under arms; 34 first rate full strength divisions; 700 aircraft; 500 tanks; and 2100 field guns. A serious fighting capability. A final irony is that many of these Czech tanks were later used in the 1940 German invasion of France.

Panzer 35 (t) - 434 were built by Skoda, with 244 seized by Germany 

The Soviet Union had large forces but a military structure weakened by Stalin’s purges. Yet other countries at the time were far from weak. France, apart from its fully manned Maginot fortifications, had 90 divisions, 1000 tanks, about 1100 military aircraft plus a strong and effective fleet. Britain had 20 divisions, 1000 tanks, 1400 aircraft and the world's largest and best equipped navy. 

For comparison, Germany at the time had barely 31 divisions, 19 of which were only at two thirds' strength. The Wehrmacht had about 700 serviceable tanks, mostly of inferior design (even in 1939 Germany's production of tanks was less than the UK's). The Kriegsmarine was small, with only six battleships, the German navy having been circumscribed by the Versailles treaty. Germany also had about 1500 aircraft.

The Czech forces alone, on their own territory with excellent fighting strength, might have been a match for Germany, though the latter would clearly have increased its military resources in a prolonged conflict. But taken with the combined military strength of France and Britain, Germany faced opponents with an overwhelming superiority in manpower, armour, air power, fire power and naval power.

Buying time?

So the British attitude was key. Apologists maintain that at Munich, Chamberlain, a man who disliked foreigners, bought time. This is completely wrong and no evidence supports it. Indeed the opposite is true. The relative and actual military positions of both the UK and France were clearly far worse in May 1940 than in October 1938. From the military numbers alone it would unquestionably have been far better to stand up to Nazi Germany in 1938.

Chamberlain at Heston airport with paper, on return from Munich

It can of course be argued, as some have, that it's not just a question of numbers, and that the Wehrmacht's training and forces' morale were better than the Allies. There is indeed some truth in this. Also public sentiment in Britain and France was strongly against any armed conflict, though this was to change completely six months later. But a war on two fronts, with possibly the Soviet Union adding a third, would surely have stopped Hitler.

Munich broke the back of Czechoslovakia. When Germany occupied the remnants of the country in March 1939 it seized around 3.5bn Reichsmarks worth of gold, foreign currency, stockpiled finished goods plus raw materials - the equivalent of some $200bn today. Prime assets included the Skoda works, with its huge armaments production capacity. It’s not always appreciated that Germany was close to economic collapse at the time. So the Munich Agreement and subsequent occupation of the whole country probably saved the Nazi regime.

Pulling the rug

Earlier in 1938, Chief of Staff General Beck, and also the German foreign service, had dispatched emissaries to Paris and London to tell them of  a serious plan to remove Hitler if the Allies stood firm over Czechoslovakia. They were ignored, or even disbelieved. Beck then resigned as Chief of Staff in the summer, but his replacement, Halder, was almost equally as strong in his opposition to a prospective war over Czechoslovakia.

Gen Ludwig Beck

As far as historians now understand it, few Germans were ready or confident about fighting in 1938. Hitler was concerned at the sparse crowd that came out to support a military parade. The lack of any public enthusiasm for war, even in this heavily propagandised state, was obvious. But as it turned out, the Allies caved in so the German generals had the rug pulled from under their feet.

Result of Munich

On his return from Munich, Chamberlain was lauded by most of the media. And in a nakedly political act he was invited by King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to appear with them on the balcony of Buckingham Palace. It's something the Royals these days would rather forget. As we can still see, intervention has risks, but non-intervention often carries bigger risks. 

Munich was undoubtedly an abiding shame, tarnishing Britain’s reputation. Had the response been different, Hitler might have been removed, and World War II would certainly never have happened. The UK's wilful disregard of Czech military capabilities was, on the face of it, surprising. Taking the Czech, French and British forces together, it is inconceivable that the Nazi war machine would have succeeded.

But the British perception of the overall military balance was hopelessly wrong. It failed to appreciate how patchy and under strength the Wehrmacht was. Still, there's none so blind as will not see - looking at the documents it's clear Chamberlain was prepared to pay any price (including sacrificing another country and disgracing his own) to avoid war. But as Churchill told him in October 1938, "You had the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour, and you will get war".