1945 Victory or defeat?

World War II is a folk memory that looms large in the British psyche. Too large it might be said. In popular culture it’s usually been a portrait of plucky little Britain standing alone facing a powerful Nazi-dominated Europe. A nostalgic and consoling narrative that’s simple for people to understand. It’s seen, says historian David Edgerton, as “a uniquely powerful moment of national success”. For many people it embodies something about the character of being British and has unfortunately infused the Brexit dispute, the noises growing ever more shrill as this looming disaster came closer.

Yet the story is laden with myths. Few of those now alive will remember the summer of 1940, as they would need to be in their mid-80s or older. Even fewer would have heard Churchill’s speeches, given in Parliament, and not broadcast. Throughout history Britain never beat continental adversaries - Louis XIV, Napoleon or Hitler - on its own. It always had strong European and later imperial allies. The huge distortion of the truth, as ignorant as it is arrogant, is a recent myth. It seems particularly beloved of the 50-70 age group. No-one at the time would have believed it.

Nostalgia and international co-operation

Such nostalgia might make more sense if it recognised that post-war successes were largely achieved with other nations. World War II was such a calamity that by 1944 the need for global change was obvious. At Bretton Woods, Britain was a main driver behind the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, formed to promote prosperity, and peace, to prevent the economic shocks that had led to war in the first place. GATT, as a trade body to reduce tariffs was also created. The United Nations dates from 1945 - the Allies fought under that name later in the war. Britain was/is a permanent Security Council member.

Mount Washington Hotel - Bretton Woods conference venue

The bodies underpinning British national security were almost all formed in the period during or just after World War II. They include NATO, GCHQ and Anglo-American nuclear co-operation. The Five Eyes intelligence sharing operation also dates from the period. These were instigated in an atmosphere not of myth and fantasy but of the reality of what had happened. They have all stood the test of time. 

With the defeat of Germany in May 1945 came the de facto partition of Europe. There emerged two antagonistic political, social, economic and military blocs. Each - Communist and non-Communist, divided by the ‘iron curtain’ - was tied to the power that had liberated it from German occupation. But a severe economic crisis engulfed both the Continent and the British Isles in the early post-war years. The story of how both continental Europe and Britain separately recovered is really the story of much of the post war period. Was Britain’s trans-Atlantic ‘special relationship’ or its trans-Channel connection more important? It was an open question and for some people remains so to this day.  

Economic problems

The British economy had been on a war footing when the country had successfully mobilised economically as well as militarily. Indeed in doing so it was the most efficient nation of all the belligerents. By 1941 GDP was 21% higher than in 1938. Edgerton has stressed the success story in producing munitions at home and using supplies from the Empire and the US to build a high quality stock of weapons. Industrial production was quickly re-oriented towards munitions, and output soared. So, for example, Fighter Command emerged from the Battle of Britain with more aircraft than it had at the start.

                                                             Logo of the Marshall Plan

But the economic costs were enormous. During the war there was a net inflow to Britain of £10bn. £1.1bn of this came from selling investments, £3.5bn from new borrowing and £5.4bn from the US via Lend-Lease, which from 1941 supplied material and munitions worth $31bn. This did not have to be paid for but when Lend-Lease was terminated in August 1945 Britain had lost two-thirds of its pre-war export trade, crucial to servicing its war debts, and could not pay for essential US supplies. Canada had lent on easy terms and India, too, was owed money via the sterling bloc. But gold and currency reserves were exhausted. The bulk of overseas assets had been sold to fund the war effort.

So at the end of the struggle Britain was basically bankrupt. It was forced to obtain $4.3bn in loans from the US in December 1945 - only finally repaid in 2006. Exports had to be prioritised and were boosted to service the debt, so rationing was maintained to this end. Europe, meanwhile, formed a Coal and Steel Community, and then a Common Market, the European Economic Community. Britain stood aside and missed that boat.  

World power pretensions

In 1947 the far-sighted US Marshall Plan pumped aid into Europe. Britain didn’t use its $2.7bn to rebuild infrastructure and modernise industry like Italy and Germany. 97% of Britain’s Marshall Aid was used to service debts. Railways, roads and telecoms remained backward and rationing only ended in 1954. Britain took defence seriously and funded it properly, but a series of governments squandered money supporting world power pretensions, keeping open far-flung military bases. This contributed to jeopardising Britain’s economic future.

Clement Attlee

The Labour government under Attlee from 1945-51 embarked on bold initiatives from the wartime Beveridge Report and 1944 Education Act - a welfare state, national health service and educational reform. These plans were largely agreed across the political spectrum. They were funded mainly from taxation. A huge home building programme followed to rehouse victims of bombing and replace slums not already destroyed by the Luftwaffe. And defence costs took up to 20% of the national budget. Yet Britain’s debt to GDP ratio fell from 270% at the peak to some 40%. Orthodox economics, perhaps, but austerity writ large.  

'All in it together'?

For Britain the ‘people’s war’ raised democratic hopes and promised a better country in future. Wartime planning had generally worked and was mainly accepted in peacetime. The organisation and control that won the war continued afterwards. But wartime myths grew. Historians later debunked the ‘all pulling together’ idea - crime rose, the black market flourished and bombed homes were looted. Strikes were frequent. And you could be off ration at a price in some classy London hotels.

The Allies called themselves the United Nations from 1944

It's worth a look back to the end of the war. In 1945 Britain had Europe at its feet. On the 'right side of history' its reputation was justly high and its prestige unmatched. But successive governments, and the population, could not ‘unthink’ an imperial global past. The chance for a leading European political and economic role was lost. In 1950 UK output per head was still 30% above the average of the six founding European Economic Community members. 20 years later it had been overtaken by most of Western Europe. Britain finally joined the EEC in 1973.

Prolonging the myths

A recent book by Duncan Weldon, 200 Years of Muddling Through, neatly summarises Britain's economic history - and the politics that drove it - from the defeat of Napoleon. It makes sober reading. It concentrates on finance and highlights some national successes but also the endless mistakes and opportunities lost. These days there's no political consensus at all about this so it's become the stuff of polarised 'culture wars'.

Memories can be risky things. When people say they ‘don’t want to change or erase our history’ they really mean they ‘don’t want to change our national historical myths’. Leaning to Europe or the US? It's certainly not one or the other. Yet in an increasingly interdependent world, but with an obviously nationalist British agenda, it's neither. In fact both options seem to be lost to the country now. Sadly the pride Britain might have in its achievements is then buried in populist fantasy, intolerance and xenophobia.

1940-45 Churchill

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, to use his full name, was a 20^th century British statesman. His reputation in Britain and the West remains strong and he regularly tops press competitions to name, impossibly, the 'greatest figure in British history'. He was actually half British and half American, with de Gaulle once chiding that ‘pure English blood never produced a single strong man’. For much of Churchill’s life he was a highly controversial figure. He himself realised reputations changed with the longer perspectives of time. His own exalted place in folk memory rests on his first 18 months as prime minister from 1940 to 1941.

Among the hundreds of Churchill biographies those of the distinguished historian Paul Addison, and the former Cabinet minister and biographer Roy Jenkins, are rounded, comprehensive and fair minded. They seem to set the standard. Despite his later iconic status, why was Churchill so widely disliked and mistrusted in his earlier career? Perhaps it’s best to separate the strands, relating first to his personality, and second to his political views and actions.

Early antipathy 

To start with Churchill was an emotional figure. Indeed he often burst into tears. His powers of judgment were unstable and he made lots of mistakes and quite a few enemies - “Hyperactive and transparently on the make, he was far from the English idea of a gentleman”, wrote Addison. He had a huge ego and always self-confidently believed himself to be ‘a man of destiny’. Not perhaps the best way to endear yourself to colleagues.

Churchill in 1904 when he 'crossed the floor'

A relentless self-publicist, he lacked restraint and could be reckless. After buying his Kent home, Chartwell, in 1922 he spent a lot of money and didn’t much care how he got it. In the aristocratic circle from which he came this was just not seen as comme il faut.

Many saw Churchill as motivated by personal ambition rather than political principle. Party defections, from Conservative to Liberal, then back to the Conservatives, hardly helped. His early parliamentary career showed him to be deliberately provocative and argumentative. His barbed rhetorical style earned him many enemies in the House of Commons. Excitable, and with a high opinion of himself, Churchill was viewed as a loose cannon. He wasn’t much loved in UK politics.

                                                                     Chartwell

So what of Churchill’s political views and actions? Mainly liberal in outlook but always pretty hard to categorise. In his early ministerial career he had a good record on social policy, being supportive of trade unions and a committed prison reformer. His attitude was that of a ‘benevolent paternalist’, aiming to preserve Britain’s existing social structure, though not to challenge it. As Home Secretary in the 1906 Liberal government Churchill put his proposals efficiently through Cabinet and Parliament and carried his department with him.

But these plus points were lost in his subsequent career. His stance on the Tonypandy unrest in the Rhondda Valley was never forgiven or forgotten by the miners involved, though some of the press thought he had been soft on the rioters. He was always an imperialist, long after its heyday, and a strong, persistent opponent of Indian independence. As Chancellor in 1925 he took Britain back to the gold standard, a bad move he later regretted. With no knowledge or background in economics he lacked the intellect to challenge the Treasury. And his opposition to the 1926 General Strike was a red line for the Labour movement.

Fallout from the Dardanelles

But it was over Gallipoli, in 1915, that Churchill’s reputation was most damaged. As First Lord of the Admiralty he proposed a plan to relieve Turkish pressure on Russia in the Caucasus by forcing the Dardanelles Straits. If successful its backers claimed it would knock Turkey out of the war. An Anglo-French task force later boosted by ANZAC forces attacked the Gallipoli Peninsula, but the venture was a costly disaster. Churchill was held by many, particularly Conservative MPs, to be chiefly responsible. Under pressure, PM Asquith agreed to form an all-party coalition, but the Conservatives’ one condition was that Churchill be removed from the Admiralty.

Gallipoli landing 1915

In late 1915 in a depressed state he resigned from the government and joined the army for a few months before being appointed Minister of Munitions. For some reason Churchill considered himself a military genius but of course this made him vulnerable to failure. Never good with operational details like sea depth or topography, Gallipoli exposed the limits of his understanding. It was toy soldier stuff. Addison wrote that the fiasco was “the greatest blow his self-image was ever to sustain”. 

PM and Defence Minister?

As Prime Minister in the 1940s Churchill created for himself the new post of Defence Minister. But it’s a strangely persistent myth that he was a good war strategist. Immediately after the withdrawal from Dunkirk he insisted on sending fresh troops to France in a half-baked attempt to stem the German advance. Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Lord Alanbrooke’s memoirs here make some uncomfortable reading. Norway and Turkey, always Churchill obsessions, remained favourite areas to attack. Madagascar and Sumatra, with the Aegean islands, were later included. None of this made the slightest sense.

He enjoyed eating and drank enthusiastically, sometimes to excess. He suffered strokes and respiratory problems (not made public) that needed prolonged treatment during which he was effectively out of action. He was not really grabbed by domestic politics or national administration. And he went on numerous extended trips overseas. From 12 January 1943 when he left for the Casablanca Conference, Churchill was abroad and/or seriously ill for 203 of the next 371 days, well over half the period.

Master of the English language

Fortunately the UK coalition government was well organised with some capable figures to manage affairs day to day. The population and economy were on a war footing. It required a degree of discipline and planning that Churchill might have regarded as too ‘socialist’ had he really thought about it. But he saw it was vital for the country to pull together in all senses if it was to prevail.

Stories of late night drinking sessions with service chiefs, watching films of Churchill’s choice, well - you feel the embarrassment. The CIGS and other military leaders had endless arguments with Churchill and soon learned to shield their plans from him. They had to stop his interventions doing too much harm while keeping the USA and other allies onside. Churchill, with his rather Victorian outlook, didn’t understand modern warfare, the need to service tanks and aircraft, plus the demands of communications and logistics. He never accepted why, with an army of 300,000, only 100,000 could be put in the combat field. Alanbrooke wrote, “We couldn’t have won the war without him but we damn near lost it with him”.

1st Vicount Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff 

Getting it right

So why is Churchill seen as a great man, indeed among the greatest? He was keen to burnish his own image and reputation, of course. And he was a master of the photo-op. But in truth the answer is surely that on three crucial issues he was right. First, against common wisdom, he opposed the appeasement of Hitler from 1933. The horrors of World War I were still raw in the public mind. And while most of the media and political sentiment was focused on doing anything to avoid a repeat, he saw clearly that Nazism had its own evil trajectory. So evil that, whatever the cost, it had to be stopped. This was not a popular stance, until war began. But it was the right one.

When he became prime minister in May 1940, many were worried that a warmongering loose cannon was to be in charge. But he showed true leadership and proved just what was needed. His first Commons address was the “blood, toil, tears and sweat” speech to prepare the country for a long war. It included phrases reverberating ever since. “You ask what is our aim? I can answer in one word: it is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.”

Using the power of English

Churchill used his mastery of the English language to rally Britain and put some backbone into the public mood. He wrote the speeches himself, then practised them alone until the words, flow and timing were right. His efforts succeeded brilliantly, but as they were given mainly in the Commons, few people actually heard them live at the time. Yet it showed he was serious. And while he knew that Britain was in little danger from a German invasion, even had one been attempted, he realised it was vital to galvanise the country and the Commonwealth for the prolonged struggle to come.      

When in late May 1940 Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax wanted to seek Mussolini’s mediation with Hitler for Britain to come to terms, his initiative was defeated in the War Cabinet. Some writers and film makers have said Churchill came close to agreeing this. But with fellow Cabinet members Attlee, Greenwood and Sinclair all strongly opposed (ignored by some of these writers with ‘dramatic licence’), as well as the 25 strong outer Cabinet, there was no realistic prospect of this. The public mood had completely changed too, and the nation had little appetite for any accommodation with Hitler.

With Roosevelt at Casablanca, 1943

The final critical thing that Churchill got right was to court the Americans. For while the USA didn’t enter the fray until Germany declared war in 1941 after Pearl Harbor, Britain benefited from US destroyers, war materiel and other supplies from 1940 under Lend-Lease. Churchill always knew that a friendly USA was vital to at least avoiding defeat. He stayed close to Roosevelt and used his charm to impress the American public and administration. In his speeches he spoke in stentorian tones of the New World coming to the aid of the old and used mention of his American mother to political effect. He relied on experience to try and avoid obvious sore points, like British imperialism, which would inflame the Americans.       

A man in full

So Churchill became a huge figure in British history, at least from 1940-41 as a war leader, even if not at all in the way some people might imagine. Arthur Marwick called him "one of my least favourite politicians", but that is to ignore his aura, and his warm personality. A romantic, yes, but a very human one. The persona he projected was attractive to many people, in Britain and abroad. He could communicate effectively, wrapping the nub of an issue for public consumption in just a few words which resonated. 

Writer and journalist, as well as soldier and politician, he also loved painting (with some of his works accepted by the Royal Academy), plus horse racing and bricklaying, among much else. There was lots in his life, including a supportive wife, Clementine, and children. A man of many parts or as novelist Tom Wolfe might have had it, “A man in full”. 

It’s interesting that when Gladstone’s biographer, fellow politician Roy Jenkins, began his life of Churchill, he regarded Gladstone as the greater man, but changed his mind while writing it. The huge power of Churchill's personality swayed him. He ended by ranking Churchill: “…with all his idiosyncrasies, his indulgencies, his occasional childishness, but also his genius, his tenacity and his persistent ability (to be) larger than life, as the greatest ever (occupant of) 10 Downing Street”.

1940 German invasion threat?

When France collapsed in mid-June 1940 the German staff had not even considered, let alone planned, the invasion of Britain. No troops had received any training for seaborne landings and nothing had been done to procure the means to move armed forces across the Channel. Air superiority, let alone supremacy, would be a minimum requirement for any realistic German invasion plan. But this, too, never came near to being achieved. Nor was there any real political will to invade. But the episode remains one of the great myths of British history.

German miliary resources

German naval resources were sparse. Losses in the Norway campaign had been significant - three cruisers and ten destroyers had been sunk. In addition two heavy cruisers and one battleship had been severely damaged and were laid up for repairs. So in July 1940 Kriegsmarine head Admiral Raeder had only one heavy and two light cruisers, plus four destroyers, available. As celebrated Third Reich historian Richard Evans points out, “This was a woefully inadequate force with which to attempt to win command of an English Channel protected by five Royal Navy battleships, 11 cruisers and 30 destroyers, backed by another major naval force that could sail from Gibraltar at a moment’s notice”. The French fleet, which might have provided extra capacity for Raeder, had been largely destroyed by Britain at Mers-el-Kebir.

German Chief of Staff Franz Halder

The German position was so poor that even had the RAF been decimated, the Royal Navy would almost certainly have beaten any German invasion attempt itself. Not only were there nowhere near enough ships to protect any large troop carrying force, the 2000 or so flat bottom barges the Germans had scraped together were mainly culled from Rhine river service. The effect of gathering together every commercial barge available was seriously to disrupt economic activity in Germany and the Low Countries. The vessels would be sitting ducks for RAF bombers and totally unsuitable for a Channel crossing in anything but the calmest weather. It has been demonstrated that the RN would not even have needed to fire a shot. The barges, if approached by British warships, would simply have been sunk in the wash.

'Invasion barges' assembed at Wilhelmshaven

Sandhurst war game modelling, much later on in the 1990s, showed just how hopeless were the prospects for a German seaborne attack. Whatever parameters were changed, including at an extreme, non-intervention by the RAF, it failed to produce a positive outcome. In short the result would have been a catastrophe.

German military views

Unsurprisingly perhaps, the German Navy was not at all enthusiastic about an invasion given its paucity of ships and usable landing craft. Playing for time it suggested it would be in a far better position to undertake such a venture in May 1941, the following year.

The Wehrmacht, too, was unhappy at the prospect. It had just fought some major battles in France and Belgium, and wanted time to re-group, replace or repair its equipment, and rest its troops. Officers were also concerned that no training had been undertaken and that the transport arrangements and plans to re-supply the invading forces were shambolic or non-existent. Even had they secured a bridgehead there was no proper plan to supply the troops involved. If the army was forced to fight, it wanted to disperse its forces and attack in multiple locations along a 200 mile front on England’s southern coast.

Kriegsmarine officers, however, would have preferred to advance on a narrow front in a concentrated thrust, to minimise their vulnerability to both naval and air attack. Chief of Staff Halder protested “this would be like putting my men through a sausage machine”. An argument between the two services developed.

Comparative air strength

Air force strength between the sides was effectively at a rough parity of numbers. In mid-August 1940, at the start of the Battle of Britain, there were 1379 RAF fighter pilots in a state of operational readiness. The comparable number of Luftwaffe pilots was 870, though the RAF pilots were of course spread all over the country while the Germans were concentrated along the Channel coast. Evans points out that between 8^th and 31^st August nearly 900 German planes were shot down, of which at least 443 were fighters. British losses in the slightly longer period 6^th August to 2^nd September were 444. By early September the RAF in fact had more than twice as many pilots ready to fly as the Germans did.

Messerschmidt 109E-3 1940

German raids only became intense after 18^th August. The UK radar network, the subject of some investment in the late 1930s, remained largely intact. It was supported by thousands of civilian spotters in the Royal Observer Corps, so Luftwaffe movements could be tracked far inland. German radio messages were also being intercepted. RAF fighter command planes could thus normally be scrambled in time and were in little danger of being hit on the ground. RAF Fighter Command was able to retreat beyond German range to give more time for its planes to scramble, and further reduce the Luftwaffe’s ability to provide fighter cover for its bombers. 

The RAF pilots - mainly young men - who were shot down were largely on home territory and those surviving might be rescued and bravely returned to duty, whereas many downed German pilots spent the rest of the war in captivity. UK numbers were in any case boosted by pilots from both the Commonwealth (especially Canada, New Zealand and Australia), from Czechoslovakia and, most notably of all, Poland, whose famed 303 squadron had Fighter Command’s highest rate of destruction against the Luftwaffe.

Polish work on the German Enigma machines and their codes had been going on throughout the 1930s. The Poles had cracked the early coding and informed both British and French security in 1939, before the war began. Meeting in August 1939 near Warsaw British experts were thoroughly briefed by the Poles, two of whom later came to Britain to work on decryption. And while it was not until 1941 that the naval Enigma submarine messages could be deciphered, by July 1940 British intelligence could read decrypted Luftwaffe messages. From these the War Cabinet learned of the dismantling of crucial air loading bays in Holland, and realised there would be no invasion. 

Radar coverage 1940

Luftwaffe fighters, mainly Me109s, were a fair match for RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires. They were better above 20,000 ft, but lost their advantage at lower altitudes where RAF planes were more manoeuvrable. The Luftwaffe was in general built to give close support to ground forces. Its fighters found it harder to protect bombers in the air and ran short of fuel fairly quickly.

German bombers supported too limited a payload to be fully effective. Their attrition rate was unsustainably high. And the UK was faster at replacing lost aircraft. On 23^rd August the number of operational Hurricane and Spitfire fighters was 672. By 6^th September, at the peak of the battle, this had risen to 738. German aircraft production trailed significantly behind that of Britain. In fact from July 1940 Britain was producing twice as many fighter planes as Germany, hardly the usual narrative of this episode.

Nazi leadership doubts

Of course in a dictatorship like Nazi Germany senior people in civilian and perhaps especially military services are strongly inclined to tell their superiors what they want to hear. But the lack of enthusiasm for a British invasion was clear. Perhaps the only senior Nazi totally behind the idea was Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, whose hatred of the English dated from perceived slights while serving as German Ambassador in London. It is hard to find anyone of comparable rank who was anything like as zealous.

Hitler himself was not keen. His attitude to Britain was always ambivalent. He admired the British Empire for its apparent power and influence in the 1920s and 1930s. And he regarded the Anglo-Saxons as racial cousins who he hoped would join him to make common cause with Germany. He thought Churchill might be replaced. But eventually, after much deliberation, and with a reluctance obvious to his entourage, he signed a directive on 16^th July for an invasion. This had the important caveat ‘only in case of necessity’.

Joachim von Ribbentrop

But to will something, however half-heartedly, is not to make it happen. D-Day in 1944 took two years to plan. By comparison only 10 weeks was allowed for Seelöwe (Sealion), with a projected launch date of 24 September. No detailed plan could have been drawn up in that time, let alone any proper training completed. A low level rehearsal was in fact tried near Boulogne with just 50 vessels in the daytime with no opposing fire (though the real thing was supposedly to be at night under fierce land and naval bombardment). Even so, fewer than 50% of the craft reached their targets in the allowed timeframe.

Hitler made his ‘peace offer’ to Britain on 19^th July 1940. It was immediately dismissed in London. The British War Cabinet was convinced that with the overwhelming strength of the Royal Navy, a German Channel crossing was most unlikely. And while Britain retained air superiority and was backed by the huge strength of the Empire, it was impossible for any invasion to succeed. In fact Churchill was so convinced of this that he believed an attempt would actually be a good thing - it would fail disastrously, badly affecting German prestige and morale. And as early as 14 August there were signs that Hitler was backing away from a landing.

Royal Observer Corps spotter 1940

The weakness of the German Navy, the inadequacy of its air force (plus the fact that its messages were intercepted), and the problems of supplying its army were obstacles enough. Add to this the reluctance of its military and political leaders, and it was clearly impossible that any German invasion would have had the slightest chance of success. The coast of Southern England was well defended in any case, with British, Canadian and Indian units, themselves reinforced with troops redeployed after June’s Dunkirk evacuation. To repeat, no proper invasion planning, let alone rehearsal, was done by Germany. And even such token steps as were taken were abandoned on 17^th September, a week before the presumed invasion date.

Making of a myth

The false idea that Britain ‘stood alone’ in 1940 against certain German invasion, is etched into the collective national memory, and particularly strongly among those born long afterwards. Fighter Command fought well, of course. But Britain was in no way alone and there was basically no risk of a successful invasion. Many people become angry when the truth is pointed out. They have absorbed the myth through family, school and popular culture. Sadly this false folk memory is still a major strand of Britain’s self-image.

Spitfire Mk 1

So why was the invasion threat so widely believed, then and even now? The answer, surely, is simply propaganda. It suited both sides, for different reasons, to maintain the fiction. Germany wanted to keep up pressure to try to bring the UK to negotiations. In fact there was little hope of this, despite various books and films claiming otherwise. Neither the six man War Cabinet, nor the wider government and parliament would have agreed to peace talks. Like the narrative of Britain standing alone against a vastly superior enemy, it is a myth.

For Britain, maintaining that the Seelöwe invasion threat was real suited the War Cabinet in its aim of energising the British population for a potentially long war, and speeding up re-armament. This was later virtually admitted by Churchill in his World War II history and others in their memoirs. Yet it's perhaps surprising that it should still be believed by so many people more than 80 years later. As has been fairly pointed out, a German invasion might have been contemplated, but was not actually planned. Had it been attempted it would have been nothing less than a disaster for the Reich.

1938 Munich Agreement

The Munich Agreement in September 1938 was surely a pivotal moment in European history (and a rich source for those engaged in counterfactuals). The issue was a genuine one of war or peace, and if things had taken another course the world’s history might have turned out quite differently. The episode was far more critical, for instance, than the short and one sided British War Cabinet argument - portrayed in films and books - with Lord Halifax seeking Italian mediation in May 1940.

One of the Maginot fortifications in northern France

But a huge myth has taken root which even now is still widely believed. It’s that Nazi Germany was so militarily strong in October 1938 that Britain and France had no alternative but to buy time to prepare for the coming conflict. This is totally untrue. At the time of the Munich Agreement the Nazis were actually weak - economically, militarily and politically. But the seizure of Czechoslovakia so transformed Germany’s fortunes that within 18 months it was effectively able to take on both Britain and France. So if any time was bought, it was to Germany's benefit.

Background to the crisis

Through the spring and summer of 1938 Czechoslovakia was the main European flashpoint. Hitler had never accepted the legitimacy of this state, which had emerged from the 1919 Versailles Treaty. The Nazi propaganda machine was turbocharged for an onslaught on the Czech government’s supposed mistreatment of about three million German speaking people in the Sudetenland - western border areas in Czechoslovakia.

Konrad Heinlein

The Sudeten leader, Heinlein, wanted first, special privileges and then, unity with Germany for the Sudeten German people. In this he was supported and largely directed by the Nazis from Berlin. Hitler became more and more bellicose on this issue, which he was clearly determined to force as the summer wore on.

France had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, but was clear that it would only fight to defend the country if Britain came in on its side. The Soviet Union had a friendship treaty with the Czechs but its military data is not included here partly because it is unclear on what conditions the USSR would have fought and partly due to the unreliable figures. But adding them to the total would make the case even more unassailable.

Balance of forces - telling arithmetic

Historian Richard Evans' detailed and comprehensively researched work here sets the standard. It’s important to recognise, but usually ignored, that Czechoslovakia at the time, if helped by Britain and France, was ready and willing to fight. Its military strength: 1.5m men under arms; 34 first rate full strength divisions; 700 aircraft; 500 tanks; and 2100 field guns. A serious fighting capability. A final irony is that many of these Czech tanks were later used in the 1940 German invasion of France.

Panzer 35 (t) - 434 were built by Skoda, with 244 seized by Germany 

The Soviet Union had large forces but a military structure weakened by Stalin’s purges. Yet other countries at the time were far from weak. France, apart from its fully manned Maginot fortifications, had 90 divisions, 1000 tanks, about 1100 military aircraft plus a strong and effective fleet. Britain had 20 divisions, 1000 tanks, 1400 aircraft and the world's largest and best equipped navy. 

For comparison, Germany at the time had barely 31 divisions, 19 of which were only at two thirds' strength. The Wehrmacht had about 700 serviceable tanks, mostly of inferior design (even in 1939 Germany's production of tanks was less than the UK's). The Kriegsmarine was small, with only six battleships, the German navy having been circumscribed by the Versailles treaty. Germany also had about 1500 aircraft.

The Czech forces alone, on their own territory with excellent fighting strength, might have been a match for Germany, though the latter would clearly have increased its military resources in a prolonged conflict. But taken with the combined military strength of France and Britain, Germany faced opponents with an overwhelming superiority in manpower, armour, air power, fire power and naval power.

Buying time?

So the British attitude was key. Apologists maintain that at Munich, Chamberlain, a man who disliked foreigners, bought time. This is completely wrong and no evidence supports it. Indeed the opposite is true. The relative and actual military positions of both the UK and France were clearly far worse in May 1940 than in October 1938. From the military numbers alone it would unquestionably have been far better to stand up to Nazi Germany in 1938.

Chamberlain at Heston airport with paper, on return from Munich

It can of course be argued, as some have, that it's not just a question of numbers, and that the Wehrmacht's training and forces' morale were better than the Allies. There is indeed some truth in this. Also public sentiment in Britain and France was strongly against any armed conflict, though this was to change completely six months later. But a war on two fronts, with possibly the Soviet Union adding a third, would surely have stopped Hitler.

Munich broke the back of Czechoslovakia. When Germany occupied the remnants of the country in March 1939 it seized around 3.5bn Reichsmarks worth of gold, foreign currency, stockpiled finished goods plus raw materials - the equivalent of some $200bn today. Prime assets included the Skoda works, with its huge armaments production capacity. It’s not always appreciated that Germany was close to economic collapse at the time. So the Munich Agreement and subsequent occupation of the whole country probably saved the Nazi regime.

Pulling the rug

Earlier in 1938, Chief of Staff General Beck, and also the German foreign service, had dispatched emissaries to Paris and London to tell them of  a serious plan to remove Hitler if the Allies stood firm over Czechoslovakia. They were ignored, or even disbelieved. Beck then resigned as Chief of Staff in the summer, but his replacement, Halder, was almost equally as strong in his opposition to a prospective war over Czechoslovakia.

Gen Ludwig Beck

As far as historians now understand it, few Germans were ready or confident about fighting in 1938. Hitler was concerned at the sparse crowd that came out to support a military parade. The lack of any public enthusiasm for war, even in this heavily propagandised state, was obvious. But as it turned out, the Allies caved in so the German generals had the rug pulled from under their feet.

Result of Munich

On his return from Munich, Chamberlain was lauded by most of the media. And in a nakedly political act he was invited by King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to appear with them on the balcony of Buckingham Palace. It's something the Royals these days would rather forget. As we can still see, intervention has risks, but non-intervention often carries bigger risks. 

Munich was undoubtedly an abiding shame, tarnishing Britain’s reputation. Had the response been different, Hitler might have been removed, and World War II would certainly never have happened. The UK's wilful disregard of Czech military capabilities was, on the face of it, surprising. Taking the Czech, French and British forces together, it is inconceivable that the Nazi war machine would have succeeded.

But the British perception of the overall military balance was hopelessly wrong. It failed to appreciate how patchy and under strength the Wehrmacht was. Still, there's none so blind as will not see - looking at the documents it's clear Chamberlain was prepared to pay any price (including sacrificing another country and disgracing his own) to avoid war. But as Churchill told him in October 1938, "You had the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour, and you will get war".

1929-39 The Great Depression

This is commonly viewed as a period of almost complete economic failure, typified by deprivation and hunger marches. But is this an accurate picture? The Wall St crash starting on ‘Black Tuesday’ 29 October 1929 was clearly the greatest financial disaster in US history. And its effects were felt all around the globe, not least in Britain. A tsunami event, showing how interconnected the world had become. But the US crash simply dealt another blow to a British economy which had suffered for 10 years from a long term structural weakness. Wall Street’s Black Tuesday was the final straw.

1930s soup kitchen

The Depression, or Great Slump, really lasted longer than a decade in Britain. The end of World War I caused the country’s economic output to fall off a cliff, declining by 25% between 1918 and 1921. It didn’t completely recover until World War II. Some economic historians therefore argue that Britain really suffered a 20 year long depression. As the Wall Street crash hit Britain at a low ebb, with less scope to fall further, the economic decline between 1929 and 1934 was relatively less severe than in the rest of the world. And from 1936 re-armament picked up some of the slack.

Structural economic problems

So what were Britain’s structural problems? From 1921 the economy began a slow post war recovery but was knocked back in 1925 with the return to the gold standard. This saw sterling restored to a pre-war exchange rate of $4.86 to £1, an unrealistic level, making British exports about 14% less competitive on world markets. The economic recovery therefore stalled. To make things worse, inefficient bedrock industries like coal, steel and shipbuilding had not enjoyed the investment or modernisation needed to remain competitive. They sought to cut their workers’ wages as well as laying off thousands of employees.

Shipyard 1935

Governments of all political stripes - including the 1929-1931 Labour administration - stuck to ‘classical economics’. The emphasis during the period was on maintaining a balanced budget. A far better policy, only widely recognised later, would have been to run budget deficits to increase demand via domestic credit expansion. But measures like quantitative easing were then unheard of. With interest rates low, a large scale programme of public works (or infrastructure as we might now call it), would have been both cheap and effective.   

Poor global response

Nevertheless it has to be said President Roosevelt’s New Deal plan, pumping billions of dollars into the US economy, led by huge public works, only gradually lifted unemployment. It was not until World War II that the US economy fully recovered. Other countries suffered similar loss of demand, falls in exports and mass unemployment. But ‘beggar my neighbour’ policies with tariffs on overseas goods were a failure, making the problem worse. Britain cut its imperial tariffs but raised them against the US and others. Globally, many banks failed and governments faced a financial crisis as American credit dried up.

Meanwhile in Britain the 1931 ‘National’ (mainly Conservative) government cut wages and unemployment pay, further reducing purchasing power and worsening the situation. With unemployment reaching nearly 3m something had to give, and in September 1931 the Treasury was finally forced to abandon the gold standard. This effective devaluation proved an immediate success as sterling’s exchange rate fell by 25%. British exports became more competitive, even if the global market was depressed, setting the scene for gradual economic recovery.

Regional UK disparities

Yet the structural problems remained, particularly in the mining, steel and shipbuilding areas of the country. The most depressed regions were the North-East, Yorkshire and Lancashire, Scotland, Northern Ireland and South Wales, areas dominated by heavy industry. From 1929 to 1932 ship production fell by 90%, which in turn hit the coal and steel sectors. 

Jarrow marchers

The export-oriented northern textile industries were also badly hit, as was Glasgow. In some towns unemployment reached 70%, so millions were left destitute, queuing at soup kitchens. These hard times scarred the memories of those living through them and proved socially divisive.

Terrible memories as these were, they were not at all typical of the South and Midlands. Indeed, while in the early 30s unemployment rates in these areas reached over 10%, by the end of the decade they had fallen to historically low levels. Interest rates of 2% powered the economy. A suburban house building boom took place, particularly in the Home Counties. The 1936 new home construction peak was 365,000. People could buy semi-detached homes for typically only £400-£500. Many at the time joined the property class. This was a social and cultural, as much as an economic, change.

1933 new homes advertisement

On top of the building boom, new industries such as electrical goods - radios, cookers and household appliances - developed mass production methods. Nearly half the factories opened between 1932 and 1937 were in the sprawling Greater London area. The other main growth sector was motors. Those Midlands cities that had built a motor industry - Birmingham, Coventry and Oxford - prospered in the 1930s. The number of cars on British roads doubled in the decade.

1930s Hoover building, Perivale, West London 

Employment and unemployment

So if in the 1930s you had a job, and kept it, you were by and large ok. Interest rates were low, and houses were cheap. Cars and other new products might be within reach, and with low inflation, prices of goods were generally not a major problem. More females in the South were taking up work outside the home, with growth of employment from a thriving economy. But in the slump areas of the North, Wales and Scotland none of this occurred and there was little employment growth. These regions remained depressed for most of the decade.

Morris 8 from the boom motor industry

Unemployment in the 1920s may have been higher than previously thought due to varying accuracy of measurement. Unemployment nationally did not exceed 3.5m during the 30s, but crucially this was from a far lower working population - under 20m against today’s 33m. An 18% national unemployment figure was clearly severe enough, but local rates were in practice often much higher, and many families in the worst affected areas had only one wage earner. Today, of course, there might typically be several.

Summary of the British slump

So the Great Depression in Britain started at the end of World War I, not in 1929. A focus on iron and steel, mining and shipbuilding left the country too dependent on this heavy but inefficient sector. There was nowhere near the volume of investment needed to turn it around in what were often single industry towns and cities. The wrong measures were adopted to tackle the problem, but even so, Britain's worst hit areas were those in the North, South Wales and Scotland, the ones most reliant on the old heavy industries.

Some people in hard hit blackspots left home to seek work in the Midlands and Home Counties. In these regions the picture was the opposite, with a boom in housing and new industries. Government policies, in common with most other countries, were indeed misplaced. But even when more suitable moves - creating demand, re-armament, public works etc - were adopted, progress was actually slow. Indeed, as in the US, it wasn’t until World War II that the British recovery was sustained, and the economic picture generally improved.