At the turn of the 19th century Britain instigated the Boer War in South Africa. Indeed it was earlier more widely known as the South African War. The British Empire came to the aid of the mother country battling its enemy - not five million heavily armed Germans, but a few thousand Afrikaans-speaking Protestant farmers, or Boers. At the start a gung ho attitude was shared in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with a particularly jingoistic mood in Britain. By its end it had given way to severe doubts on the legitimacy and purpose of the Empire. And looking back, it marked the beginning of the end.
Causes of the war
After 1836’s Great Trek following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, the Cape farmers of mainly
Dutch, Huguenot and German descent, or ‘Boers’, formed two independent
republics, the Orange Free State and Transvaal. ‘Boers’ was Afrikaans/Dutch for
farmers. In 1875, having annexed Basutoland, Britain planned a Canada-style
confederation of South African states. Part of a neo-imperialist ‘scramble for
Africa’ surge, it was sold to the world as a basis for progress and economic growth under
British rule - unacceptable to both Boer states. Fighting, with heavy British losses,
followed in 1880 until internal independence for Transvaal was conferred in
1884.
It was not a stable situation. And when gold was
discovered in the Transvaal Witwatersrand in 1886 things deteriorated. With diamonds
also found in the Orange Free State both Boer republics were seen as a
political and economic bar to British territorial control. Imperialists like
Cecil Rhodes wanted a Cape to Cairo railway to bolster Britain’s continental rule.
But rich states would clearly become a strong geographic barrier to such schemes.
The goldfields, controlled by outside investors, had attracted 45,000 mainly British prospectors, or Uitlanders. Britain wanted the vote for them but the Boers feared that if granted, their own people could soon be outnumbered. Rhodes’1896 Jameson Raid to overthrow Paul Kruger’s Transvaal government was a total fiasco. But it inflamed Afrikaner nationalists.
Britain’s point man in the Cape, Alfred
Milner, thought Kruger was pressing for a united South Africa under Afrikaner
rule. He felt war was the only way to combat what he, and quite a few others, viewed as the Boer threat to the British Empire.
Support from the Empire
The Uitlanders’ cause was the excuse for war and for a huge military build-up at the Cape. Milner, Cape Prime Minister Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, wanted to annex the Boer republics. They were backed by the mining syndicate owners. Conservative PM Lord Salisbury in London was less sure. He despised jingoism but felt an obligation to British South Africans and thought the Boers just wanted a Dutch South Africa. But he was concerned over cruel Boer treatment of black South Africans, which he viewed as slavery.
Looking back it seems surprising that so many people in far flung parts of the British Empire were such enthusiasts for war. It’s testament to the way large numbers of imperial citizens still viewed themselves as British. If Britain was at war, whatever the circumstances, they saw it as their responsibility to join the fight. The Uitlanders pretext seems to have been generally swallowed by the public, while little thought was given to the wealth and power of gold, the true reason for the conflict.
Early defeats and a turnaround
The war began in October 1899 when it was widely
thought that Britain, with a well trained and equipped professional army, would
easily beat the amateur Boer fighters. At its peak the Boers could only field
up to 40,000, and usually far fewer. British and Empire forces numbered up to
450,000, plus tens of thousands of African auxiliaries. Yet a few well-armed Boer units, catching
overconfident and underprepared opponents, soon besieged Ladysmith, Kimberley
and Mafeking. In December 1899’s ‘Black Week’ they won battles at Magersfontein,
Stormberg, and Colenso, where British commander Redvers Buller’s 21,000 strong
army lost 1,300 men killed, missing or wounded.
After negative reports from the field Buller was
replaced by Lords Roberts and Kitchener who built a new HQ staff team. This
phase of the war, with increased British troop numbers, saw the (costly) relief
of the besieged towns, ending with Mafeking in May 1900. The last event caused
tumultuous joy in Britain, with garrison chief Robert Baden-Powell, who’d earlier
got himself trapped there, becoming an instant hero throughout the Empire. He
went on to found the Boy Scouts but his reputation was later tarnished by
accusations of racism and his supposed admiration for fascist dictators.
The Boers were soon beaten on all fronts with Britain
taking their capitals Bloemfontein, and then in June, Pretoria. The British
army seized, then annexed, the Orange Free State and Transvaal, and the Boer
leaders went into hiding or exile. The war seemed all but over, and the
government called a general election to capitalise on the wave of popular
support. Held in September-October 1900 as the ‘Khaki Election’ it unsurprisingly
returned a landslide Conservative majority.
But the war wasn’t over. The Boers’ new military
leaders resorted to highly mobile hit and run guerrilla tactics. The British
response was a scorched earth policy, burning crops and farms and killing livestock.
The survivors, including women, children and African workers, were forced into
concentration camps. Probably some 50,000 died of hunger and disease in dire conditions. This left a long legacy of bitterness toward Britain and thus some real ambivalence about joining the Allied side in World War I.
War arithmetic and uneasy peace
The Boers surrendered in May 1902. Under the Treaty of
Vereeniging the former republics became colonies to be merged with the Cape and
Natal Colonies into the Union of South Africa in 1910. But self-government was
accepted within a few years before union, and questions like the rights of the
majority black population plus Indian and other minorities were left for them alone to
decide later. They also received money to cover war damage, though many farmers
driven out by scorched earth activities could not return as the land had become
unworkable. This aside, the terms overall were quite generous but did little to
counter lasting Boer resentment.
Both sides saw the conflict as essentially a ‘white
man’s war’. By the end some 30,000 local armed black recruits were serving with
British forces. The Boers refused to treat these men as legitimate combatants.
If captured they were summarily executed. Black communities had driven Boer
commando fighters and their families from several areas of the Transvaal,
curtailing Boer operations and contributing to a willingness to seek peace
terms. Black occupation of these areas was not recognised either in 1902 or
later with the Union. Some 20,000 Boer fighters had earlier given up and accepted
British rule. 5,000 of them even joined British Empire forces to fight against
their former comrades.
24,000 South Africans, mainly from the Cape and Natal,
served in British colonial units, joined by a few thousand Uitlanders who left Transvaal shortly before the war began. Empire
forces were boosted by volunteer contingents from Australia, New Zealand and
Canada. Lack of local infrastructure saw 75,000 injured or sick soldiers
returned to Britain. With nowhere to house Boer prisoners, 24,000 were sent
overseas, many to St Helena. 23,000 Empire troops were killed against 6,000
Boers, but civilian deaths at up to 100,000 dwarfed this.
Results of the conflict
The war devastated the Afrikaners economically and
psychologically leading to poverty and growing urbanisation. They were
determined to be independent of British influence and culture. It shaped them
as ‘race patriots’ revealing an aggressive nationalism and a desire to dominate
the country. This together with a fear of the black majority, later helped bring
the infamous racially segregated apartheid
policy.
International, including imperial, opinion, became hostile
to Britain. The country’s ill preparedness for this conflict was an
embarrassment as Army recruitment saw a third of volunteers fail fitness tests. Despite the huge numbers sent out, Britain simply hadn’t enough fit men. Better health, welfare and school meals
were later adopted to combat the problem. 300,000 horses had died on the
British side, shocking public and army opinion. And rail and motor transport were
becoming recognised as vital in modern warfare, though not yet radio.
Milner later became Colonial Secretary and War
Secretary. In South Africa he was a hard liner, though drew a group of young
Oxford graduates to his service - Milner’s kindergarten - who worked to tackle post
war resentments. The reality encouraged them to become more progressive in outlook.
But by then Milner had departed. He was never linked to a political party. Historian
Colin Newbury rather politely wrote “An influential public servant for three decades, Milner
was a visionary exponent of imperial unity at a time when imperialism was
beginning to be called into question. His reputation exceeded his achievements”.
Britain’s long ‘splendid isolation’ policy was at last coming
apart. Ententes were signed with France, Japan and Russia. Whitehall began to realise
that the days of Empire were numbered. With a big public change of heart, 1906
saw a Liberal election landslide. As for South Africa, it was widely said that
Britain had won the war, but lost the peace.
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