1919-1939 Sunset of the British Empire

“Rule Britannia, Britannia rule the waves

Britons never, never, never shall be slaves”. Thomas Arne 1740

Singing this 18^th century pop song still divides the British population in a culture war. On one side are those who feel the Empire was a proper expression of the state of things, a progressive and beneficial enterprise, showing the strength and superiority of Britain and its elevated place in the world. On the other side are those who recognise Britain’s position in the global league table is not and should not be compared to the days of Victorian pre-eminence, but that without throwing its weight around, it is still a rich and important country.

Empires evolve over time and yearning for presumed past greatness is self-disabling. As historian David Reynolds writes, “the fixation with ‘decline’ - seen as real or psychological - misses the essential historical point: what’s truly remarkable is the story of Britain’s ‘rise’…the country’s principal advantage was a relatively secure island base during what was still the age of sea-power”. A lead in international industry and commerce, protected by an efficient and well developed navy, was surely the key in the imperial century of 1815-1914.

1919 Imperial Sunset

After World War I the British Empire covered nearly a quarter of the world’s land area and the same share of its population. Yet 1919 was the crunch year, the imperial sunset. The Versailles Treaty stressed self-determination, the right of a country or people to rule themselves. It was hard for Britain to support this for others, yet deny it to those in its own Empire. Clearly Britain had no right to rule people who didn’t want to be so ruled. But many slow learners who had absorbed the British imperial idea just couldn’t unthink it.

Jawaharlal Nehru and his family, 1918

Severe doubts were raised about managing a large and attenuated group of lands straight after the Boer War. The Royal Navy was not strong enough to protect everyone, everywhere. Dominions like Canada, Australia and New Zealand were in practice too far away to be ruled from London, so were effectively running their own affairs. And whatever the rights and wrongs of things, it was becoming increasingly obvious that with the huge costs of WWI, Britain could no longer afford an empire.   

The greatest 19^th century expansion of British power took place in Africa. But India, long the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire, was the key problem, and a divisive issue both in India itself and in Britain. The Dominions, now labelled as the British Commonwealth, had signed the 1919 peace treaties themselves and joined the newly formed League of Nations as independent states. These were ‘white’ run countries. India was run by the Indian Civil Service with a largely effective use of local cultural practice in civil law and administration. 

Jewel in the crown

In 1917, partly in recognition of India’s huge contribution to the wartime Allied forces, India Secretary Montagu issued a Grand Declaration that Britain would now be “increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India”. The 1919 Government of India Act followed, based on joint rule, or ‘diarchy’. This was a complex scheme for part central, part provincial rule, with a sort of doubling up of administrative tasks between London and local appointees. It signalled that India would soon govern itself and then become independent.

Edwin Samuel Montagu

The April 1919 massacre of perhaps 1000 civilians in Amritsar killed this momentum. A dreadful event that divided British and Indians for good, it also split Britain, as many swallowed the spin that the killings had stopped a revolt. It strengthened the resolve of the independence movement. Gandhi’s Congress Party ended cooperation with the Indian government, launching a policy of widespread civil disobedience. Every London move was behind the curve - not enough to win Indian support but with the permanent risk of defeat in the Westminster Parliament, where imperialist sentiment and a lack of realism blocked progress. Many, including former Cabinet minister Winston Churchill, were implacably opposed to Indian independence.     

Mural depicting the Amritsar Massacre 1919

A series of Round Table Conferences was held from 1930 to 1931 in London amid Gandhi’s Salt March. In fact Congress suspended civil disobedience so Ghandi could attend one of these gatherings. But his claim to represent all of India was not backed by other delegates. It was a tall order to get this sub-continent with so many languages, religions and provincial authorities - including numerous hereditary princes - to agree on such important issues. The Round Tables failed.

At last, in 1935 a new Government of India Act created a form of federal self-government, but with reserved powers for Britain. The only problem was that no major group in India accepted it. Nehru called it “a machine with strong brakes but no engine” and a “Charter for Slavery”. Moslem leader Jinnah called it “thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable”. As for the proposed Federation, even the princes couldn’t agree to it. Congress leaders were jailed or otherwise restricted until in 1942, after the collapse of Britain’s Far East position, India was promised total independence.

After World War II, in 1947, Britain finally pulled down the curtain on its ‘jewel in the crown’, 30 years after it was first signalled in Montagu’s Grand Declaration. The nature of the sub-continent with its numerous languages, religions and cultural traditions meant this would always be a tough task. But while India had many competing interests - and independence in practice was judged possible only with partition, establishing a mainly Moslem Pakistan - it was long opposed by British irreconcilables. Both nations joined the Commonwealth, a source, perhaps, of some satisfaction.

Wider imperial interests

While India was by far the most important British imperial issue between the wars, Egypt also figured on Whitehall’s worry list. Never officially part of the Empire it was a British ‘protectorate’ but without legal support. Egypt was pivotal to Britain’s global strategic position, with the Suez Canal critical for India and Far East trade links and proximity to Britain’s Gulf oil supplies. When the protectorate was ended in 1922 little changed, as Britain kept a strong base and armed forces there. Britain’s Cairo Embassy was in reality the Middle East’s dominant power centre.

Egyptian and British royalty 1911

After World War II Britain was spending up to 20% of its GDP on defence, much of it on maintaining a global presence. For a country carrying heavy post war debts this was unsustainable. But if 1919 was the Empire’s tipping point, total extrication took another 50 years. From Versailles onwards a continuing British imperial mindset was often a source of strain and tension with the key US ally, particularly evident as the two fought together in World War II. The 1956 Suez crisis exposed British weakness and the limits of American tolerance.

Imperial propaganda

So what are the myths? The British Empire was hardly a totally benign entity helping colonised lands and people. It certainly had its share of cruelty and exploitation. Slavery was a big part of its early development and even well into the 20^th century, brutality and lack of care towards native peoples was all too common. Of course Britain managed some useful and constructive things throughout the empire. But the Amritsar massacre harmed Britain’s reputation in India and beyond, while the full story of the torture and killings in Kenya is restricted and yet to be told.       

Gandhi leading the Salt March, 1930s

Far from being a source of wealth, the Empire in the 20^th century was a huge and increasingly costly entity. And rather than establishing the country’s strength - punching above its weight - the imperial burden showed Britain’s weakness and caused friction with allies, including most notably the US. It took many people in Britain a long time to accept that respect is earned by what the country does - in which it had a generally good record - rather than by how many people it ruled who didn’t always wish to be so ruled.

Post imperial sentiments

Despite today's cultural scrapping, unfortunately stirred by the government, with popular if childish media froth over statues and songs, Britain remains a major country. As David Reynolds says, “it’s the only European member of the Western Alliance apart from France, to maintain a capacity for power projection outside the NATO area…It ranks among the top three in both inward and outward foreign investment. The result is a position in power and wealth that one might expect for a post-colonial state of its size, population and resources. And the country’s history, culture and language constitute immense ‘soft-power’ assets.”

The British Empire 1919

It’s hardly surprising that post imperial sentiments remain. Other countries are not free from the notion of recovering ‘greatness’, a populist theme throughout history. Mussolini pushed renewing the Roman Empire, and France had huge trouble disengaging from Indo China and then Algeria. In Russia Putin yearns to re-create the Soviet Union, a huge imperialist entity. In the USA Trump’s MAGA message struck a chord with many, adorning tee shirts and baseball caps. 

Yet are these really the examples to emulate? With accelerating global change, and all its related problems, a leap of fantasy into the imagined past, however appealing to some, is surely not the answer. A clearer view of our history would treat the past not as comfy nostalgia, but as Churchill himself said, “a springboard, not a sofa.”

1914-18 First World War

Initially called the ‘Great War’, this was so cataclysmic in British (and world) history that it seems right to start with Barbara Tuchman’s classic The Guns of August. Describing the May 1910 London funeral of Edward VII, with the royalty and rank of 70 nations on display for the last time, she memorably wrote: “The muffled tongue of Big Ben tolled nine by the clock as the cortege left the palace, but on history’s clock it was sunset, and the sun of the old world was setting in a dying blaze of splendour never to be seen again”.

It was indeed the end of the old order. Filmed for posterity via the Library of Congress archive, the scenes offer a clear snapshot of 1910. In the conflict to follow, four empires disappeared. The war spawned fascism and communism, and with new states created and old ones diminished, the map of Europe, and the world, was completely re-drawn. Colonial powers were much weakened. Global political and economic tectonic plates shifted in a historic movement not foreseen. Britain’s position as a world financial and trading power ended. It was surely one of the world’s great turning points.

Nine sovereigns at George V's funeral 1910 

Causes of the war

Looking back, the roots of it were attenuated, maybe starting with the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War and a strong united Germany’s arrival on the world stage. Competitive colonial ‘Scramble for Africa’ wars, plus conflicts in the volatile Balkans showed the fragility of Europe’s imperial order. The Boer War had ended Britain’s splendid isolation - ententes with France, Japan and Russia soon followed. Germany, allied with Austria-Hungary, was locked in a naval race with Britain. A diplomatic and military re-alignment took place. And while nobody much liked or trusted their new friends, there seemed no alternative.

It used to be said that World War I was inevitable due to the alliances and guarantees involving Europe’s powers. These entanglements put the key players on a collision course which sooner or later would lead to war. All it needed was a spark to light the fuse, and an unstoppable chain reaction, a European ‘black tornado’, would follow. The spark was the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. This idea has since been discredited. Analysis of state papers and other documents shows there were numerous chances to stop the catastrophe. For various reasons - bellicosity, indecision, weakness, national honour - none were taken.

Discarding such a deterministic approach to its causes, the search has been on to allocate blame. Post war, Germany was held accountable by the victorious Allied powers, and forced to accept the Treaty of Versailles. Doubts spread on the justice of this, not least in Germany, and a blame sharing narrative developed - everyone was at fault. It all changed in the 1960s when German historian Fritz Fischer showed his country had long planned to attack France. This version was fiercely questioned in Germany. Currently there is probably no consensus.

Armed alliances mobilise

In July 1914, three weeks after the Sarajevo murder, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to Serbia. Russia backed Serbia, and mobilised. On 1^st August Germany declared war on Russia, supporting its 1879 treaty partner Austria-Hungary with a famous ‘blank cheque’. France then mobilised to aid Russia. On 2^nd August Germany demanded free passage through Belgium to attack France under the Schlieffen Plan, devised in 1906. Belgium refused, so Britain declared war on the invader Germany. It is worth stressing Britain had guaranteed Belgian neutrality in 1839 and felt honour bound in its obligation. Germany’s Kaiser blustered that Britain had gone to war ‘over a scrap of paper’. 

Rival military alliances 1914

The Russian-French-British entente nations and their Imperial allies became known as the Allied Powers. Germany and Austria-Hungary, later joined by the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, but losing Italy, were termed the Central Powers. The Allies were joined by Romania, Japan, China and in 1917, most notably, by the USA. With other countries and areas involved, it soon became a truly global war.

After being checked in September on the Western Front at the Battle of the Marne, German forces faced years of trench warfare against the Allies. Despite offensives from each side, under fierce attrition, little ground was won or lost. In eastern Europe Russia was defeated by the Germans at Tannenberg, and with Austrian attacks, the war became more mobile with territories seized and occupied. After the 1917 Russian Revolution a ceasefire on the Eastern front allowed Germany to move troops to France in 1918 for a final push. It failed. The Allies, boosted by new tactics and American troops, forced a general German retreat until an armistice was signed in November 1918.

Myths and misunderstandings 

As in all wars there are some misconceptions. Simply confining these to the British context yields several misunderstandings. The dominant image is of trench warfare. But this was true only on the Western Front. Four million soldiers died on the Eastern/south Eastern fronts - Russians, Austrians and Ottomans. It is often downplayed in British coverage.

Battle of the Marne 1914

But the war at sea also played a major role. German submarine attacks on British shipping caused the loss of millions of tons of food and other supplies. And the German switch to unrestricted attacks on neutral (notably US) shipping, brought America into the war. While Jutland was the only significant naval battle in the conflict, the result was to keep the German High Seas Fleet bottled up for the duration. Britain’s blockade of Germany caused such distress and domestic disruption that it was a key factor in the armistice.

Aircraft were also more important than used to be thought. The war began only 10 years from the Wright brothers’ Kitty Hawk flight. But huge strides meant immediate use of aerial photography. Sadly, British commander John French doubted the air surveillance on German forces in autumn 1914, so much of Britain’s Expeditionary Force was lost. By the end, aircraft were key to the Allies’ attack force. An astonishing 200,000 aircraft were built in the war, 53,000 of them by Britain.

Sopwith Camel

The general belief at the start that the war would be over by Christmas was based on overstated claims of the strength of one’s own side and ignorance or under-appreciation of the resources of opponents. Some thought the war would be too costly to last long - states’ borrowing power would soon run out. German commander von Moltke, when warned of this, replied, “I’m a soldier not an economist”. The Allies leant on US resources even before America entered the war. By the end of the conflict they had spent an estimated $58bn, while the Central Powers had spent $25bn.

Britain was actually less severely affected than many others. Of the country’s six million men under arms, 12% were killed or died, under 2% of the whole population. For comparison the 1640s Civil War figure was 5%. France’s World War I deaths were twice as high, at 1.4m soldiers and 4% of its population. Germany lost 2m soldiers, 4% of its population. Even harder hit were allies Romania which lost 8%, and Serbia, which lost an enormous 20%, of their national populations.

Just a military conflict? 

A long held belief has this as a soldiers’ war, with civilian casualties rare. This may be a British perspective but overall it’s emphatically not true. In central and eastern Europe vast numbers of civilians died. One million Armenians were deported by the Ottomans to their deaths and Germany saw half a million excess deaths from malnutrition after the Allies’ blockade. Germany and Austria killed many thousands of civilians in the occupied territories of Serbia, Romania and Belgium. Russia deported its Jewish borderland population. These were major war crimes. In total nearly 8m civilians were killed in this war.      

Cartoon - Wilhelm surveying Pres Wilson's 14 points

It would be wrong to think of public pressure in any country being responsible, or even enthusiastic, for the war. The idea was grafted on later. Neither did British and German troops play a football match on the front line during 1914’s Christmas truce, though it was clearly still a memorable moment. Most deaths on the Western front were not caused by machine guns, but by artillery shells. None of the armies expected this and had instead planned for a war of manoeuvre and movement. Nor was the ‘lions led by donkeys’ line at all fair. It was dreamt up decades later by politician Alan Clark. Over 200 generals were killed, wounded or captured. By 1918 Britain’s army was in fact strong and efficient.    

There was poor understanding of post traumatic shock among troops, and the mental effects of battle generally, but it improved as the war went on. Over 3000 men on the British side were court martialled and sentenced to death, but only about 10% of them were actually shot, nearly 80% of these for desertion (some of which could have been provoked by trauma). Shell shocked men were usually shipped back home for treatment. There were about 80,000 recorded cases of psychological injury among British forces during the war.  

Publicity and individuals 

Figures like Gen. Joseph (Papa Jo) Joffre and TE Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) became well known to the public via newsreels and their own writings. Joffre posed as an honest, calm, sensible figure. He courted public popularity but actively sought the credit for others’ actions and even worse, blocked their careers. And TE Lawrence was only one of several Allied agents working among Ottoman subjects to foment rebellion and weaken a military opponent of the Allies. But as with so many British history ‘heroes’, he was a great self-publicist. 

General Joseph Joffre

After the October Revolution Russia sued for peace and in March 1918 signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. German units were quickly moved to the Western front. Army commander Ludendorf feared if his forces could not succeed that year in a final offensive, the US entry into the war would tip the scales and Germany would certainly lose. He was right. Over summer and autumn 1918, boosted by US troops and under their ‘creeping barrage’, as used by the Canadians at Vimy, the Allies steadily rolled back German forces. Germany’s allies had given up and revolution was in the air at home. The armistice was signed on 11^th November 1918.

Peace settlement and war guilt

The 1919 Versailles peace conference majored on President Wilson's 14 points, much circulated and discussed during the war. This agenda dealt with war guilt, damage to civilian property, colonies, nation-building via self-determination and other issues. As a result of Versailles Germany lost 10% of its territory but was largely unoccupied. Reparations were linked with its ability to pay but in the event were mostly unenforced. The treaty was noticeably less harsh than that ending the 1870-71 Franco Prussian War, and the savage Brest Litovsk peace that Germany had just imposed on Russia. But Versailles was painted as extremely severe and grotesquely unfair by nationalists, notably but not exclusively Hitler, in order to beat the Nazi drum.

Perhaps the misconception that most needs correction is that of the ‘soldier poets’. Historian David Reynolds has criticised the impact of Sassoon and Owen, among others, in portraying World War I as a “pointless, trench-bound slaughter directed by boneheaded generals”. This is far from true and even the war poets weren’t unequivocally anti-war. The conflict was hard, costly and some awful decisions were made. But few people at the time saw it as a terrible waste for no reason. It was fought, rightly, to stop German autocratic military domination of Europe.

With 18m military and civilian deaths World War I was historically the costliest in human lives and resources. Margaret Macmillan’s detailed 2013 study, The War that ended Peace, is a fine assessment of the causes of this conflict. She remains broadly neutral on war guilt but today’s historians largely feel Germany, a highly militarised state, must take most of the responsibility. Whether or not it meant to precipitate a general war, Germany was willing to take that risk. It was hugely reckless in July 1914 to give Austria an unqualified ‘blank cheque’.

Why was Germany so keen to back Austria’s determination to crush Serbia and launch a Balkan war? An autocratic state whose generals believed wars - against Denmark, Austria and France - had served them well, Germany’s ruling elite felt threatened by democracy. Its parliament now had a socialist majority, hostile to militarism and promising an end to the Kaiser’s rule. The conservative leaders felt a triumph abroad would help stem this tide.

In 1914 Germany was confident it could quickly defeat Russia and its ally, France. It discounted Britain, the other Entente party, as its army was small - ‘contemptible’ as Kaiser Wilhelm famously remarked. Germany jammed the St Petersburg to Paris wireless links, lied to every state in denying knowledge of Austria’s ultimatum, and rejected Britain’s proposed four-power conference. Hardly the actions of a state trying to avoid war.

The disastrous belief in myths   

The Schlieffen Plan required German troops to cross to France through Belgium, whose neutrality Britain had guaranteed. It has been said that Britain used Belgium as a mere pretext to join the war. This is untrue. Much of the ruling Liberal party was firmly opposed, as was public opinion, until Germany invaded Belgium. Some say that Britain could have stayed neutral, but this strains belief. A Europe controlled by any militaristic authoritarian state would not have been in British interests and would be counter to everything in Britain’s foreign policy history. Britain and others needed to stop German plans - it was a war that had to be fought.

TE Lawrence, by Augustus John 

After the 1918 armistice, the German Dolchstoss im Rücken claim of not being defeated, but ‘stabbed in the back’ took hold, and was keenly spread by right wing elements. It was a conspiracy narrative. The country had been betrayed by the ‘November criminals’. No responsibility for the calamity but national self-pity, a key factor in Hitler’s re-run 20 years later.

Critics of the supposed folly and injustice of Versailles never spelled out what they thought of the European peace Germany would have imposed. In September 1914 with victory looking within its grasp Germany drafted a private shopping list, neutralising France and its resources, annexing Luxembourg and turning Belgium and Holland into vassal states. It was a hint of future demands. Worryingly Germany’s malign and simplistically self-defeating early 20^th century foreign policy to keep a ‘free hand’, though long banished from Germany itself, still has unfortunate echoes in other countries, notably Britain, today.

1899-1902 The Boer War

At the turn of the 19^th century Britain instigated the Boer War in South Africa. Indeed it was earlier more widely known as the South African War. The British Empire came to the aid of the mother country battling its enemy - not five million heavily armed Germans, but a few thousand Afrikaans-speaking Protestant farmers, or Boers. At the start a gung ho attitude was shared in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with a particularly jingoistic mood in Britain. By its end it had given way to severe doubts on the legitimacy and purpose of the Empire. And looking back, it marked the beginning of the end.

Causes of the war

After 1836’s Great Trek following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, the Cape farmers of mainly Dutch, Huguenot and German descent, or ‘Boers’, formed two independent republics, the Orange Free State and Transvaal. ‘Boers’ was Afrikaans/Dutch for farmers. In 1875, having annexed Basutoland, Britain planned a Canada-style confederation of South African states. Part of a neo-imperialist ‘scramble for Africa’ surge, it was sold to the world as a basis for progress and economic growth under British rule - unacceptable to both Boer states. Fighting, with heavy British losses, followed in 1880 until internal independence for Transvaal was conferred in 1884.

Map showing Boer republics in 1899

It was not a stable situation. And when gold was discovered in the Transvaal Witwatersrand in 1886 things deteriorated. With diamonds also found in the Orange Free State both Boer republics were seen as a political and economic bar to British territorial control. Imperialists like Cecil Rhodes wanted a Cape to Cairo railway to bolster Britain’s continental rule. But rich states would clearly become a strong geographic barrier to such schemes.

The goldfields, controlled by outside investors, had attracted 45,000 mainly British prospectors, or Uitlanders. Britain wanted the vote for them but the Boers feared that if granted, their own people could soon be outnumbered. Rhodes’1896 Jameson Raid to overthrow Paul Kruger’s Transvaal government was a total fiasco. But it inflamed Afrikaner nationalists.

Arrest of Dr Jameson after the failed raid

Britain’s point man in the Cape, Alfred Milner, thought Kruger was pressing for a united South Africa under Afrikaner rule. He felt war was the only way to combat what he, and quite a few others, viewed as the Boer threat to the British Empire.

Support from the Empire

The Uitlanders’ cause was the excuse for war and for a huge military build-up at the Cape. Milner, Cape Prime Minister Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, wanted to annex the Boer republics. They were backed by the mining syndicate owners. Conservative PM Lord Salisbury in London was less sure. He despised jingoism but felt an obligation to British South Africans and thought the Boers just wanted a Dutch South Africa. But he was concerned over cruel Boer treatment of black South Africans, which he viewed as slavery. 

Cecil Rhodes

Looking back it seems surprising that so many people in far flung parts of the British Empire were such enthusiasts for war. It’s testament to the way large numbers of imperial citizens still viewed themselves as British.  If Britain was at war, whatever the circumstances, they saw it as their responsibility to join the fight. The Uitlanders pretext seems to have been generally swallowed by the public, while little thought was given to the wealth and power of gold, the true reason for the conflict.

Early defeats and a turnaround

The war began in October 1899 when it was widely thought that Britain, with a well trained and equipped professional army, would easily beat the amateur Boer fighters. At its peak the Boers could only field up to 40,000, and usually far fewer. British and Empire forces numbered up to 450,000, plus tens of thousands of African auxiliaries. Yet a few well-armed Boer units, catching overconfident and underprepared opponents, soon besieged Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking. In December 1899’s ‘Black Week’ they won battles at Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso, where British commander Redvers Buller’s 21,000 strong army lost 1,300 men killed, missing or wounded.  

Relief of Ladysmith, John Bacon

After negative reports from the field Buller was replaced by Lords Roberts and Kitchener who built a new HQ staff team. This phase of the war, with increased British troop numbers, saw the (costly) relief of the besieged towns, ending with Mafeking in May 1900. The last event caused tumultuous joy in Britain, with garrison chief Robert Baden-Powell, who’d earlier got himself trapped there, becoming an instant hero throughout the Empire. He went on to found the Boy Scouts but his reputation was later tarnished by accusations of racism and his supposed admiration for fascist dictators.

The Boers were soon beaten on all fronts with Britain taking their capitals Bloemfontein, and then in June, Pretoria. The British army seized, then annexed, the Orange Free State and Transvaal, and the Boer leaders went into hiding or exile. The war seemed all but over, and the government called a general election to capitalise on the wave of popular support. Held in September-October 1900 as the ‘Khaki Election’ it unsurprisingly returned a landslide Conservative majority.

Paul Kruger

But the war wasn’t over. The Boers’ new military leaders resorted to highly mobile hit and run guerrilla tactics. The British response was a scorched earth policy, burning crops and farms and killing livestock. The survivors, including women, children and African workers, were forced into concentration camps. Probably some 50,000 died of hunger and disease in dire conditions. This left a long legacy of bitterness toward Britain and thus some real ambivalence about joining the Allied side in World War I.

War arithmetic and uneasy peace 

The Boers surrendered in May 1902. Under the Treaty of Vereeniging the former republics became colonies to be merged with the Cape and Natal Colonies into the Union of South Africa in 1910. But self-government was accepted within a few years before union, and questions like the rights of the majority black population plus Indian and other minorities were left for them alone to decide later. They also received money to cover war damage, though many farmers driven out by scorched earth activities could not return as the land had become unworkable. This aside, the terms overall were quite generous but did little to counter lasting Boer resentment.

Both sides saw the conflict as essentially a ‘white man’s war’. By the end some 30,000 local armed black recruits were serving with British forces. The Boers refused to treat these men as legitimate combatants. If captured they were summarily executed. Black communities had driven Boer commando fighters and their families from several areas of the Transvaal, curtailing Boer operations and contributing to a willingness to seek peace terms. Black occupation of these areas was not recognised either in 1902 or later with the Union. Some 20,000 Boer fighters had earlier given up and accepted British rule. 5,000 of them even joined British Empire forces to fight against their former comrades.

Lord Roberts enters Kimberley

24,000 South Africans, mainly from the Cape and Natal, served in British colonial units, joined by a few thousand Uitlanders who left Transvaal shortly before the war began. Empire forces were boosted by volunteer contingents from Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Lack of local infrastructure saw 75,000 injured or sick soldiers returned to Britain. With nowhere to house Boer prisoners, 24,000 were sent overseas, many to St Helena. 23,000 Empire troops were killed against 6,000 Boers, but civilian deaths at up to 100,000 dwarfed this.

Results of the conflict

The war devastated the Afrikaners economically and psychologically leading to poverty and growing urbanisation. They were determined to be independent of British influence and culture. It shaped them as ‘race patriots’ revealing an aggressive nationalism and a desire to dominate the country. This together with a fear of the black majority, later helped bring the infamous racially segregated apartheid policy.

International, including imperial, opinion, became hostile to Britain. The country’s ill preparedness for this conflict was an embarrassment as Army recruitment saw a third of volunteers fail fitness tests. Despite the huge numbers sent out, Britain simply hadn’t enough fit men. Better health, welfare and school meals were later adopted to combat the problem. 300,000 horses had died on the British side, shocking public and army opinion. And rail and motor transport were becoming recognised as vital in modern warfare, though not yet radio.

Milner later became Colonial Secretary and War Secretary. In South Africa he was a hard liner, though drew a group of young Oxford graduates to his service - Milner’s kindergarten - who worked to tackle post war resentments. The reality encouraged them to become more progressive in outlook. But by then Milner had departed. He was never linked to a political party. Historian Colin Newbury rather politely wrote “An influential public servant for three decades, Milner was a visionary exponent of imperial unity at a time when imperialism was beginning to be called into question. His reputation exceeded his achievements”.

Alfred Milner

Britain’s long ‘splendid isolation’ policy was at last coming apart. Ententes were signed with France, Japan and Russia. Whitehall began to realise that the days of Empire were numbered. With a big public change of heart, 1906 saw a Liberal election landslide. As for South Africa, it was widely said that Britain had won the war, but lost the peace.

1853-1856 The Crimean War

The Crimea conflict punctured a century of general European peace. Or at least that’s the typical British perspective, as some of the more senior among us learned at school. A war of just over two years to curtail Russian ambitions for warm water ports and for control of the eastern Mediterranean. Called the ‘Eastern Question’ or ‘Straits Question’ in old history books, it was usually seen as little more than an irritating interruption to the Pax Britannica. ‘A great confusion of purpose’ writes historian Richard Cavendish led to a war noted for its notoriously incompetent international butchery.

Far from being a minor skirmish, the war claimed the lives of some 700,000 soldiers (mainly dying of disease) and ended 40 years of European peace. A much bigger conflict in scope and scale than often perceived in Britain, it aggravated Russian and Ottoman rivalry in the Balkans, a spark setting off World War I. It may even have helped the rise of Germany by blocking Russian European ambitions. Historian Orlando Figes calls it a major turning point in European and Middle Eastern history. ‘The earliest example of a truly modern war - fought with new industrial technologies, modern rifles, steamships and railways, novel forms of logistics and communication like the telegraph, important innovations in military medicine, and war reporters and photographers directly on the scene’.

Causes of the war

The conflict began in 1853 with religious tensions over holy places in the Ottoman towns of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, then a deeply religious state, was an emotional figure. He assumed the role of protector of the (Orthodox) Christian minorities and sent troops into present day Romania, threatening to partition Ottoman lands. The Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia, once it was assured of the support of Britain and France. Confronted with British and French military superiority, Nicholas still chose war, perhaps believing ‘God was on his side’ in Russia’s global mission. 

Tsar Nicholas I

France and Britain clearly cared little for holy places but feared Russia would dismantle an already ailing Ottoman Empire. A late diplomatic compromise was actually reached, but Tsar Nicholas then baulked. In fact the resulting imperial struggle for influence over Ottoman lands never wholly lost its religious overtones.

Allied invasion

After a year the war stepped up a gear when in September 1854, under public pressure, the Allies invaded the Crimean Peninsula. A victory at the battle of Alma led to their besieging the key Russian naval hub of Sevastopol. The Allies felt the city would soon fall, but after Russian counterattacks at Balaclava and Inkerman, a stalemate ensued. Trench warfare through a severe winter followed, with artillery bombardment and serious losses on all sides, especially for the French and Russians. Disease, particularly from cholera epidemics, killed far more than the fighting.

The Caucasus front during the conflict 

It took 11 months before the French broke through and forced Russia to evacuate Sevastopol. Neutral countries saw how things were going and began to join the Allies. It was effectively the end of the Crimean War, though scattered actions lasted until March 1856 when Russia finally admitted defeat. Britain and France were relieved, as the conflict was becoming unpopular at home. The Treaty of Paris on 30^th March 1856 formally ended the war. Russia could no longer base its warships in the Black Sea, and the Ottoman vassal states Wallachia and Moldavia became largely independent. Some of the religious access disputes were also settled. 

Charge of the Light Brigade

The wider scope

Against the common wisdom the war wasn't fought just in Crimea. While clearly the main theatre, and the siege of Sevastopol its most costly and sustained engagement, the earliest clashes took place in the Balkans and Turkey. The focus only moved to Crimea, the main base of Russia's Black Sea fleet, after the Allied invasion of the peninsula in 1854. But the conflict saw naval actions and intermittent fighting in the Caucasus, the Baltic (a blockade of Russian ships and ports), the Pacific, and even as far as the northern White Sea. 

The 'thin red line' at Balaclava

The Allies, despite their technical and logistical superiority, were not strong as a cohesive force. Britain and France, age old opponents, often found it hard to work together. British commander Lord Raglan was even heard to call the French ‘the enemy’. And given religious and cultural differences, neither power liked the mainly Turkish Ottoman forces. Colonial prejudices saw them branded as unreliable. They were reduced to manual labour and sometimes even mistreated. But intra Christian rivalry - Orthodox versus Western, plus despised absolutism against supposed liberty and civilisation - was just as marked.  

Casualties

Britain’s role in this war was limited and its losses relatively slight, at least compared to those of Russia, France and the Ottomans. This is perhaps one reason for Crimea being generally given a back seat in British history. On the Allied side Ottoman losses totalled over 45,000 men, of whom 25,000 died of disease. France lost nearly 100,000 in total of whom 75,000 died of disease. And Britain lost 22,000, of whom some 18,000 died of disease. As for Russia it is believed to have lost at least 450,000 soldiers, with a shocking 377,000 dying of disease. Other belligerents' losses probably totalled another 75,000. Countless civilians were also among the forgotten victims.

Napoleon III

Details of the Sevastopol siege and related battles were publicised in newspaper coverage as never before. Mismanagement and tactical failures were quickly exposed, prompting demands in Britain for professionalism in both the military and medical spheres. The Light Brigade action at Balaclava was the last British cavalry charge in Europe, but unbelievably stupid orders were later played down with the rather thin ‘someone had blundered’ line. In fact the charge did scatter much of the Russian artillery, even if this was a small benefit from such a costly initiative.    

Medicine and nursing

A redeeming feature was the supposedly selfless heroism of Florence Nightingale - the caring ‘mother’ in a suitable woman’s role. Her hospital was based at Scutari, far from Crimea’s battlefields. Applying what for the time were modern nursing practices she probably saved some lives, but could do little against the cholera epidemic. Her patients’ survival figures were not great. Well connected, she gained publicity and influenced ministers to improve medical care. The ‘lady with the lamp’ personified the Victorian virtues of godly self-sacrifice, while accepting the social and cultural pecking order. A national figure chiming with the times.

Nicolai Pirogov, father of Russian field medicine 

She wasn’t the war’s only famous nurse. Mary Seacole travelled to Crimea at her own expense having been rejected by Nightingale. A curious half Jamaican figure - hotelier, barmaid, nurse - she also offered care to some soldiers. And unlike Nightingale she was based near the front. Others without a network of powerful friends performed similarly. Daria Mikhailova on the Russian side used her own money in dressing wounds. Dr Nikolai Pirogov helped introduce field surgery and the use of anaesthetics. His was a lasting contribution in medical care. 

Results of the war

France was at the time under the stifling rule of Napoleon III. Despite appalling French losses the dictator survived until 1870. France had no Black Sea interests and obviously wanted peace. It soon resumed its role as Europe’s pre-eminent power.

Russian humiliation badly weakened its influence in Europe. But it led to fundamental reforms under Tsar Alexander. These covered social institutions, serfdom, the legal and justice system, and local government. Russia’s backwardness spurred rapid modernisation in its education and in the military. With Europe’s moving tectonic plates and new unified states like Germany and Italy emerging, Austria perhaps lost most of all politically, despite the fact that it took no part in the war.

Treaty of Paris, Eduard Dubufe

In Britain the rabble rousing press had smeared those who questioned the wisdom of the war. Palmerston, a classic imperialist, had stoked the xenophobic indignation of the British people. When he succeeded Lord Aberdeen as prime minister in January 1855 he took a hard line, wishing to widen the scope of the conflict, stir up unrest inside the Russian empire, and reduce the threat to Europe for good. But as so often, the press and public, so keen to go to war, by 1856 wanted out.

Many observers developed doubts about the small aristocratic elite providing Britain’s military leadership. But demands to restructure the army were first contained, then forgotten after the war with the return to a comforting complacency about the ‘superior British way’. Easy wins in colonial wars against technically inferior people seemed to settle any doubts. But while the Royal Navy might protect trade and the Empire, it could offer little in a European conflict. The lack of a major British army was a lesson that in 1914 would have to be learnt all over again.