The 1832 Reform Act

It’s sometimes claimed that the 1832 Reform Bill was a watershed in British democracy. It marked the country’s evolutionary transition from first, absolute monarchy, then through a period of oligarchy to a modern constitutional settlement. The bedrock of the democratic political system, it supposedly typified Britain’s incremental approach to peaceful political change and its transition to a modern state. This, at least, is what many learnt at school. But is it true? Did 1832’s political and constitutional change pave the way for democracy?

British politics before the Reform Bill

To start with it’s worth taking a look at the state of British politics 200 years ago, in the 1820s. There were two main parties - Whigs and Tories - representing different interests. These had existed since the 17^th century having taken shape through the Exclusion crisis of the 1680s. The parliamentary process functioned through two houses, the Commons and the Lords, under a constitutional monarchy. But voting in elections was hardly democratic. It had developed in a ‘catch as catch can’ process with seven different ways to qualify to vote. The key thing is that over 95% of adults did not qualify.

Canvassing for votes, William Hogarth

There were no votes for women, or for most people without property. Areas that had grown quickly in the industrial revolution had barely any Commons seats. Manchester, with just under 200,000 people had no seats, whereas Cornwall, with roughly the same population, had 42. Depopulated places like Old Sarum had seven voters but returned members. Dunwich did, too, though it had disappeared into the sea. In these ‘pocket boroughs’ one dominant employer or landowner might control the voting. Seats were bought and sold. Voters had to vote publicly, so might be shy in opposing a local magnate’s candidate.

“Before 1832, around a third of parliamentary constituencies were controlled in this way”, says historian Matt Cole. “Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that most constituencies - between 60 and 75 per cent - were not contested at all”. Some powerful local figures 'owned' several seats simultaneously. The Duke of Norfolk topped the charts here - he controlled 11. It was in pretty well every respect a corrupt system.

Demands for reform

In the 1820s calls for reform grew louder and were backed by the parliamentary Whig leaders. But what did they want and how did they plan to get it? On the face of it, supporters demanded fairer popular representation as industrial areas and interests hardly counted against an over-represented aristocratic ruling elite. Reformers wanted to correct the absurd and out of date distribution of parliamentary seats. And they also sought a better demographic balance. Despite 1832’s total electorate rising to 435,000, as a share of population it had fallen to only 3.2%. This was less than it had been in 1640.       

Duke of Wellington, John Jackson

An overwhelming case, then, but it took ages to convince Parliament. By 1830 the prime minister,Wellington, was the sole member of his Tory government refusing to accept the need for parliamentary reform. That year’s election returned the Whigs with a large majority under Lord Grey. But 15 months of detailed argument and delaying tactics were involved before the Bill passed through the Commons. The Lords was another problem. The King had to threaten to create enough peers to ensure its passage there. The Act eventually received royal assent on 7^th June 1832.

Effects of the 1832 Act

Those believing in the benefits of this measure have some awkward issues to confront. By removing non-resident voters, 30% of those boroughs that survived reform had fewer voters than before. And the Act did not abolish all pocket or proprietary boroughs in England and Wales, as at least 40 continued to exist, along with many attendant abuses. The ‘poor ratepayer’ franchise of 37 boroughs was abolished and an essentially democratic feature was replaced by a standard £10 pa property qualification. This disenfranchised numerous working class men, besides those rural tenants lacking security of tenure.     

Lord Grey, by Charles Hayter

So in practice the vote was taken from some groups, but extended to the commercial middle class and more prosperous rural householders. It excluded all males who fell short of the arbitrary £10 line. And all females were expressly banned from voting. While the arithmetic is hard without accurate registration figures, it seems as if the total electorate rose to 6%-7% of the population. Writes constitutional lawyer Jo Murkens, “The Reform Act thus created a division not between Whigs and Tories, but between economic (rural v industrial) interests, classes and also the sexes…The new constituents were either aristocratic or wealthy, and, of course, educated and male.”   

A democratic measure?

Democracy was never on the agenda. Commentators at the time, including the Bill’s main driver, Lord John Russell, downplayed the changes. A conservative, good housekeeping measure tidying up a few rotten boroughs and including some middle class voters. It was continuity, not real change, they reassured people. With the risk of unrepresented workers turning against parliament, the response was simple if cynical - to make aristocratic government acceptable by purging it of its most corrupt and expensive features. But the limitations were soon exposed as the Chartists organised a more radical movement to push the cause of the voteless working class.

Rotten borough cartoon

The 1832 Reform Act is often seen as a constitutional milestone. It was passed at perhaps the most dangerous moment in Britain’s political history, with the country teetering on the edge of revolution. The Act did little that it was later supposed to have done, and Britain waited almost 100 years for full adult suffrage. But it did solidify a principle - parliamentary representation should shadow population. It also shattered the Tory party. Two years later Tory leader Sir Robert Peel stated some new reform principles and renamed his party the Conservatives. Setting up clubs around Britain to fight elections, it was the dawn of modern political campaigning.

Robert Peel, by Pickersgill

Peel, according to historian Robert Saunders, was an interesting character. He exhibited several paradoxes in his various positions. He subscribed to the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland but supported Catholic emancipation in 1834. He backed agricultural protection for various reasons, but split his party when repealing the Corn Laws in 1846. There were numerous other examples. He had the priceless ability, and the intellectual honesty, to change his mind when the facts changed. He believed in a culture of atonement. His big fear was populism and where it would lead. Given today’s situation, this was to prove prescient.     

Parliamentary sovereignty?

Constitutional theorist AV Dicey saw an advance in 1832 - that people began to realise the constitution might be changed peacefully. But the men who passed the 1832 Act really had no interest in political democracy. They feared it would bring tyranny of the mob over the educated (and privileged) few, and a permanent majority over the interests of minorities. Political expedience forced them to concede the minimum to avoid possible riots or even revolution. This worked for a generation. And while a more democratic system was in retrospect perhaps inevitable, it was not the Reform Act, but changing political, economic and social factors which brought it about.

House of Commons, 1809 (destroyed by a fire in 1834)

Did the Act affirm the role of parliamentary politics? The sovereignty of parliament was originally propounded in the 1880s by Dicey. It was and still is accepted as the foundation of the British constitution. But these days government, with its patronage and media support, is very powerful. It can in practice often ignore or bypass the legislature. So is parliamentary sovereignty the basis of modern democracy? Or did it only truly apply in the context of a restricted 19^th century franchise? The question divides lawyers, historians and politicians. With an increasingly authoritarian executive, and in an age of referenda, social media and fake news, with weak ministerial and electoral regulation, recent events have clearly shown its fragility.